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t-3,6,9,…. Strategiat, jotka perustuvat menneiden neljännesvuosien tuottoihin, tuottavat paremmin 
kuin kaikkiin menneisiin kuukausituottoihin perustuvat strategiat. Toisin kuin menneisiin 
tuottoihin perustuvat strategiat yleensä, korrelaatio osakkeen hinnan ja menneiden 
neljännesvuosien tuottojen välillä ei muutu käänteiseksi yhden vuoden jälkeen.  
Löydetty kaavamaisuus on vahva. Markkinaneutraali portfolio, joka myy lyhyeksi yhtä paljon kuin 
sijoittaa, ja on rakennettu viimeisimpien neljän menneen neljännesvuoden tuottojen perusteella 
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menneisiin neljännesvuosiin voittivat yhä muut strategiat. Neljännesvuosittainen kaava on 
voimakkaampi markkina-arvopainotetuissa strategioissa, mutta näkyy myös niissä strategioissa, 
joissa joka osakkeelle on annettu sama paino. Yrityskohtaisten tapahtumien, kuten tulosjulkistusten 
tai osingon irtoamispäivän kontrollointi ei poista neljännesvuosistrategioiden ylivertaisuutta. 
Strategioiden tuotto ei myöskään ole rajattu mihinkään tiettyyn kalenterikuukauteen tai 
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1. Introduction 
 
 
The momentum effect, or the tendency of past winners to outperform past losers in the stock 
market, is one of, if not the most prominent anomaly left unexplained by the Capital Asset 
Pricing Model (CAPM) by Sharpe (1964). The phenomenon was found by Jegadeesh and 
Titman who in their 1993 article showed that significant abnormal returns were to be earned 
when investing stocks based on their performance of last three to twelve months. Momentum 
has since been proved to affect multiple major asset classes beyond listed equities (e.g. Kho 
(1996) and Erb and Harvey (2006) and also to be present in markets outside U.S. (Rouwenhorst 
(1998,1999). Despite of the full 25 research filled years from its birth, the momentum effect 
continues to puzzle the academia. 
 
Besides their dependence of past returns, stock returns are known to follow certain seasonal 
patterns. Small stocks thrive in January (Sidney Wachtel (1942) and stock performance tends 
to peak at days preceding holidays (Lakonishok and Smidt (1988). Even further, time of month, 
week and trading day all hold an effect on expected returns (Ariel (1987), Cross (1973) and 
(Harris (1986). However, before more recent advancements in the field of finance, little 
research was put to cross-sectional seasonal differences in individual stocks and the effect on 
past returns beyond the intermediate horizon.   
 
Heston and Sadka (2008) discovered that individual stock returns follow a seasonal pattern: 
Stocks’ performance of a given calendar month correlates to its performance of the same 
calendar month up to 20 years in the future. This leads to a pattern in correlation repeating itself 
every 12 moths i.e. annually. The authors formed winners-minus-losers portfolios out of U.S. 
listed equities based on their performance on past annual lagged months and showed that 
significant abnormal returns were earned with the strategy. The seasonal pattern had economic 
significance and could not be explained by the three-factor model by Fama and French (1993), 
nor with liquidity of the security or with industry of the underlying company. Later in their 
2010 paper Heston and Sadka proved this annual seasonality to also exists in international stock 
markets. 
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The seasonality literature was later extended by Keloharju, Linnainmaa and Nyberg (2016) who 
showed that rather than being a factor in itself, seasonalities were aggregated by securities 
across characteristics of different factors. They proved the annual cross-sectional pattern to 
extend to securities past listed common equity and also to several stock market anomalies. The 
authors found that seasonal winners-minus-losers strategies correlate weakly to each other and 
sustain considerably riskiness even when well diversified, implying systematic factors behind 
the phenomenon. Keloharju et al. exploited the seasonal tendencies found in anomalies to create 
an anomaly-portfolio-trading metastrategy with high abnormal returns. They noted, that the 
same-calendar-performance of anomalies was strong enough for future anomalies to be 
identified by solely studying variables accosiated with return seasonalities. 
 
Several company-specific events have been found to have an effect to the stock price, as proven 
for example by Beaver (1968) and Hartzmark and Solomon (2013). Many of the said events are 
imbedded to the fiscal year of a publicly listed company, most notorious being quarterly 
earnings announcements and dividend issuances, both of which signal crucial information about 
the state of affairs of the firm to the markets (Aharony and Swary (1980). The firm-specific 
events of the fiscal also have a strong influence on the returns of the strategies based on past 
returns. In their original study of momentum in 1993, Jegadeesh and Titman noticed that the 
profits of the momentum portfolios were concentrated around earnings announcement dates. 
Heston and Sadka (2008) confirmed their findings, but noted that the effect of earnings 
announcement is considerably smaller in portfolios based on lagged returns beyond the most 
recent year.  
 
In this Master’s Thesis, I will concentrate on previously undiscovered pattern of quarterly 
seasonality of stock returns. I will show that alongside with annual cross-sectional seasonality, 
there exists a weaker but distinctive quarterly pattern: Stock’s performance in given month t is 
dependent on its returns in past quarterend months i.e. months t-3, t-6, t-9,…. Strategies based 
on the returns of lagged quarterend months outperform those based on other past months. For 
example, a zero-investment portfolio based on the returns of last four quarterend lags earns 
average returns of 1.25% monthly from 1946 to 2016, while a portfolio based on non-quarterend 
lags yields on average 0.25% during the same period. Quarterend strategies outperform other 
strategies based on past returns in all investigated portfolio formation intervals and yield 
significantly positive returns up to portfolios based on 20-year lagged returns.  
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Quarterly seasonality cannot be solely explained by the strong annual seasonality phenomenon 
research by my predecessors. Zero-investment nonannual quarterend portfolios continue to 
outperform strategies based on all lagged months and earn positive, although mostly 
insignificant, average returns. This implies that past quarterend months do not seem to 
contribute to the long-term return reversal phenomena found by De Bondt and Thaler (1985). 
Quarterly seasonality exists in both value weighted and equal weighted portfolio returns and 
also in portfolios made exclusively out of companies of large market capitalization, implying 
that the phenomena is not tied to any particular size group. To find an underlying reason behind 
quarterly seasonality, the effect of firm-specific events like quarterly earnings announcements 
and ex-dividend dates is tested as is the calendar-month seasonality of the quarterend portfolio 
returns.  
 
The effect of past quarterend months to traditional intermediate horizon momentum 
phenomenon is strong. Even after taking into account the short-term return reversal, it is more 
lucrative and less-risky to invest based on stock returns of past four quarters than based on all 
the months of traditional momentum strategy. The results of my Thesis can help us to better 
understand the cross-sectional seasonality and the effect of past returns to stock price. They 
bring new information about the long-term return reversal effect, as it curiously does not seem 
to affect to past quarterend months like it does to others. The strong correlation between the 
returns of lagged quarterend months and stock price may also have practical implementations 
in the asset management industry. Most importantly, my finding concerning the effect of 
quarterend months to momentum profits could bring new to the thoroughly research filed of 
past intermediary horizon returns. 
 
The rest of my work is organized as follows: the next section will go through some of the most 
prominent previous studies related the effect of past returns, seasonality and firm-specific 
seasonal events. The Section 3 briefly covers my motivation for the topic and sets out the three 
hypotheses of this study. The Section 4 will describe the data and methodology used for the 
Thesis and Section 5 presents my results that are further discussed and compared to previous 
findings of the academia in Section 6. Section 7 concludes.  
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2. Literature Review 
 
 
I will next go through previous academic research on the topic of this Thesis. First, I introduce 
papers significant to our understanding of the effect of past returns to stock price, focusing on 
the momentum phenomenon. Next, I will concentrate on the two key papers of the field of 
cross-sectional seasonality, both vital for my study. Lastly, I will forgo research on the stock 
price effect of firm-specific seasonal events and some studies about post-earnings-
announcement-drift potentially important to the robustness checks of my work.  
 
 
2.1.Effect of past returns to stock price 
 
De Bondt and Thaler (1985) found that stocks that have performed poorly will outperform those 
excelled in last three to five years when using a holding period of same length. The effect was 
much more significant on past losers than on past winners and was concentrated on second and 
third year after the portfolio formation. They also noted that the portfolio of loser stocks earned 
high returns during the month of January. De Bondt and Thaler offered investor overreaction 
as an explanation for the phenomena. This effect, later named as long-term reversal, has been 
since research for example by Grinblatt and Moskowitz (2004) who found it at least partly 
independently evolved from the intermediate-term momentum.  
 
Jegadeesh (1990) presented empirical evidence on the predictability of past monthly returns to 
stocks price. The most prominent finding was the strong negative correlation of the most recent 
past month, a phenomenon later named as short-term reversal effect. The effect was found on 
stocks of all size categories. Jegadeesh also found the existence of positive price correlation on 
longer lags, 12-month serial correlation being the strongest. Lags 24 and 36 were found 
significantly positive as well. To my knowledge, this was the first mention of the annual lags 
in the finance literature. Like De Bondt and Thaler, Jegadeesh found the month of January to 
effect significantly to correlations of past returns. The cause behind phenomena of short-term 
reversal has since been debated in the academia, one prominent explanation being overreaction 
(e.g. Subrahmanyam (2005). 
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Jegadeesh and Titman’s 1993 study is credited as the birth of the traditional momentum 
anomaly. They formed winners-minus-losers portfolios based on stocks past performance with 
formation intervals of 3,6,9 and 12 months and holding periods of same lengths, consisting 
altogether 16 strategies. Returns of nearly all strategies were significantly positive, a strategy 
trading stocks based on their past 12-month returns and holding it for 3 months being the most 
profitable one. They chose a strategy with both 6-month formation and holding periods (6/6 
portfolio) for further analysis and tested its exposure to firm size and stock beta, finding only 
small differences in the magnitude of returns. When investigating seasonal effects, the authors 
found their momentum portfolios to lose in January with considerably magnitude. This 
behaviour was traced back to poor performance of small companies in the portfolio.  
 
When portfolio returns were observed up to 36 months from formation, part of the abnormal 
returns were noticed to absolve after the intermediate period of first year. The authors noted the 
short-term reversal effect to be affecting the returns of the first month after formation. 
Jegadeesh and Titman also found that winners-minus-losers strategies performed particularly 
well around earnings announcement dates in the next seven months after the portfolio 
formation. These returns consisted approximately 25% of the winners-minus-losers 6/6 
portfolio’s returns. Also, this pattern was found to reverse after longer periods, losers 
outperforming winners in times of announcements. 
 
The momentum phenomenon has since been proven to affect majority of significant 
international markets as well as multiple asset classes. Rouwenhorst (1998) found abnormally 
high returns with strategies similar to Jegadeesh and Titman (1993) in 12 European stock 
markets, including UK, Germany and France. The effect was present in all size groups, although 
being stronger in small stocks. The paper also found some correlation between momentum 
strategy profits of Europe and U.S., leaving open the question of common “momentum factor”. 
In his 1999 paper Rouwenhorst also finds momentum in emerging markets. Interestingly, 
momentum seems to be absent in listed equities of Japan (e.g. Griffin, Xiuqing and Martin 
(2003). Moskowitz and Grinblatt (1999) divide stocks into 20 industry portfolios and find the 
portfolios to experience strong momentum effect. They argue industry momentum to be a strong 
force behind the momentum effect of individual stocks. Also currencies (e.g. Kho (1996) and 
commodities (e.g. Erb and Harvey (2006) have been proved to experience the momentum 
effect. 
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It has become a standard in the finance literature to call a strategy buying past winners based 
on prior two to twelve months (t-2:12) performance and selling past losers of same interval as 
traditional momentum. This strategy exploits the positive correlation of the past year but 
excludes the most recent past month because of the short-term return reversal. For example, the 
performance data obtainable from Kenneth French’s data library follows this strategy1. 2-to-
12-month momentum is used in numerous academic publications e.g. Fama and French (1996) 
and Daniel and Moskowitz (2016).  
 
The nature of the anomaly has stayed relatively unchanged through the years. Grinblatt and 
Moskowitz (2004) noticed that “consistent winners” i.e. stocks that have had a steady good 
performance thorough past months seem to do better than those with just a few extraordinary 
months to thank from their good past returns. On the other hand, being a “consistent loser” 
seemed not to have an effect in cross-section of stock returns. Novy-Marx noted in his 2012 
article that the momentum effect is primarily caused by the firm performance from 7 to 12 
months prior to the formation of the strategy portfolio. This finding undermines the view of 
momentum as a tendency of well performing stocks to keep performing better than average. 
Novy-Marx used Fama-Macbeth regressions of securities past returns to show that the 
explanatory power of the intermediate past performance outweighed that of the more recent, 2 
to 6 months returns. This behaviour did not limit to equities, but also applied to commodities 
and currencies. Moskowitz, Ooi and Pedersen (2012) noted that while previous literature had 
concentrated on relative performance of stocks i.e. cross-sectional momentum, security’s own 
past return seems also to explain its future profits. They call the phenomena time series 
momentum and find it different, but related to, cross-sectional momentum and persistent in 
several major asset classes.  
 
From its initial discovery, reasons for momentum anomaly have been presented plenty. In their 
original paper Jegadeesh and Titman hypothesize that investors buying winners and selling 
losers cause the stock market first to overreact (superior returns in intermediate horizon) and 
that after some time stock prices return to their long-run averages (reversal in longer horizons). 
They also present an alternative theory that stock market underreacts news on short-term 
prospects but overreact to those of long-term information value. These two theories, 
                                                 
1 French, K.R., 2018, Data library, Tuck School of Business, accessed 15th of December 2017, 
<http://mba.tuck.dartmouth.edu/pages/faculty/ken.french/data_library.html>, hereafter referred as “French’s data 
library” 
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underreaction and delayed overreaction are still behind most of the present behavioural theories 
for the phenomena (Moskowitz (2010). For example, Daniel, Hirshleifer, and Subrahmanyam 
(1998) construct a model based on investor overconfidence to justify delayed overreaction and 
a model by Hong and Stein (1999) uses two types of investors “newswatchers” and “momentum 
traders” to rationalize underreaction theory. Some models combine the two theories under 
investor sentiment that explains both under- and overreaction, like that of Barberis, Shleifer and 
Vishny (1998). 
 
In addition to behavioural theories, rational explanations to momentum have been presented. 
These theories usually stem from the idea that momentum is simply compensation from risk, 
and thus can be explained by an asset prising model. This theory is supported by the strong 
correlation of different momentum strategies that is difficult to explain in behavioural models 
(Moskowitz and Pedersen (2013). For example, Johnson (2002) suggest stochastic growth rates, 
that stock prices are depended to, can explain the momentum anomaly at least partly, but also 
emphasized that finding rational explanations to anomalies like momentum does not mean that 
markets as a whole would be fully rational. Some more unorthodox views of momentum lack 
both behavioural and rational explanation. For example, Novy-Marx’s (2012) results of 
momentum being driven largely by lagged returns from prior seven to 12 months is challenging 
for current theories. 
 
There are aspects an investor must take into account before undertaking a momentum-driven 
portfolio. As aforementioned, momentum profits are seasonal, January being traditionally a 
difficult month for the strategy. A momentum strategy demands frequent portfolio-rebalancing, 
resulting in transaction costs. Jegadeesh and Titman (1993) found their results reliably 
significant after taking into account a transaction cost of 0.5%. Korajczyk and Sadka (2004) 
researched the robustness of momentum portfolios after transaction costs and the price impact 
of trading; the strategies remained profitable. The authors noted that value weighted strategies 
performed better post-trading-impact, as they are concentrated on large, liquid stocks. 
Momentum strategies also encounter infrequent drastic drops in performance called momentum 
crashes. For example, the traditional momentum portfolio upkeeped in Kenneth French’s data 
library encountered a drop of 34.4% in April of 2009. Daniel and Moskowitz (2016) noted these 
crashes to occur after market drawdowns and periods when volatility is high and that they are 
at least partly predictable. 
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2.2.Seasonality 
 
Stock prices have been known to follow certain seasonal patterns for decades. These patterns 
can be dependent on a time of a year, month, week or day. As early as in 1942 Sidney Wachtel 
noticed that small stocks tend to outperform large ones in January. This “January effect” has 
since been researched by e.g. Thaler (1987). The holiday effect promises high stock returns 
during days preceding holidays and has been studied by for example by Lakonishok and Smidt 
(1988). The monthly effect signifies that positive stock returns are concentrated to the last days 
and first halves of months (e.g. Ariel (1987). There also exists research on the effect of 
weekdays: On average the stock market performs poorly on Mondays, as found by Cross (1973) 
and investigated more recently by e.g. Berument & Kiymaz (2001). Time of day plays a part in 
stock markets, returns being large at opening and near close of the trading day (Harris (1986). 
In despite of the wide literature concerning the subject, seasonal cross-sectional variation across 
returns of individual stocks have, until quite recently, been left with little research. 
 
Heston and Sadka’s 2008 paper can be considered as the birth of the cross-sectional seasonality 
research. They found a cross-sectional autocorrelation pattern in the U.S. stock returns, in which 
high positive return autocorrelation recurred in every 12th past lag i.e. yearly. This was caused 
by a strong seasonal phenomenon: stocks that perform well or badly in a certain calendar month 
will continue to do so up to 20 years. I consider their paper to be the key previous literature of 
this Thesis and use methodology similar to them to obtain my results and perform necessary 
robustness and control checks.  
 
Heston and Sadka built stock trading strategies supported by their research using a sample of 
NYSE and AMEX -listed equities’ return data from 1945 to 2002. They formed decile 
portfolios based on returns of past annual lags and compared those to ones built based on all 
lags and nonannual lags using portfolio formation intervals up to 20 years. They found winners-
minus-losers portfolios formed based on all months to give negative returns after the first lagged 
year, as is expected by the long-term reversal effect, but also that annual-lag portfolios 
continued to earn profits in all formation intervals. The difference between performance of 
winners and losers of the annual lags was significant, although smaller on longer horizons. They 
also noted that the positive returns of a portfolio formed based on the most recent past year 
could in fact be mainly captured with the first annual lag i.e. buying (selling) stocks that 
performed well (badly) exactly one year ago. 
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The authors tested both equal and value weighted strategies. They noticed the phenomena to 
exist in both, although the returns of value weighted portfolios decreased more in magnitude 
when examining longer formation intervals. Also, the long-term reversal effect was somewhat 
smaller in value weighted results. To see whether existing risk factors explain the returns of 
seasonality strategies, they used the tree factor model by Fama and French (1993) and noticed 
the risk adjusted returns of annual strategies to remain practically unchanged. They also found 
the phenomena to sustain economic significance after examining it through various economic 
methodology. 
 
To test the robustness of the phenomena, Heston and Sadka examined several possible reasons 
behind the seasonality the cross-section of stock returns. The possible effect of liquidity, in the 
form of liquidity premium over certain months, was investigated by measuring the abnormal 
volume. There were large spikes in the average volume effect for the first five annual lags and 
smaller quarterly liquidity spikes also existed. Volatility of the stock returns was also 
investigated and similar annual pattern was found but neither volume nor volatility was found 
to explain the seasonal return patters of winners-minus-losers portfolios.  
 
After dividing their sample to three subgroups based on company market capitalization, they 
found annual-lag portfolios of large companies to perform better in intermediate formation 
intervals (2-5 years and 6-10 years) and those made of small companies to yield insignificant 
returns over longest formation intervals. However, as they concluded, the seasonality 
phenomena did not seem to be limited to any particular size group. The authors then tested the 
effect of industry to seasonal returns. The stocks were divided into 20 industries in the spirit of 
Grinblatt and Moskowitz (1999) and inter-industry component was extracted from the returns. 
Controlling for industry left majority of seasonal return patterns unexplained. 
 
Heston and Sadka also tested the robustness of seasonal strategies with traditional seasonal 
phenomena like the January effect and turn-of-the-year. Although seasonality portfolios did 
yield particularly well in January, the returns were positive in most other months also. They 
concluded the returns to be non-sensitive to calendar holding period. Next the authors 
considered fiscal-year-related seasonal events like earnings-announcements and dividends as a 
potential cause for the abnormal returns. Controlling for earnings announcement had a huge 
impact on the returns of the first full year, as could be predicted by the findings of Jegadeesh 
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and Titman’s original 1993 momentum paper, but changes were subtler in longer formation 
intervals. Controlling for dividend announcements, ex-dividend months nor fiscal-year-ends 
did not explain the profitability of seasonality strategy. Finally, they toy with the possibility of 
potential behavioural reason for the seasonality, but conclude that their findings pose 
challenging criteria for such explanation to be plausible.   
 
In 2010 Heston and Sadka published a second article on the subject of seasonality, addressing 
the phenomena in international markets. They found seasonal predictability in stock returns of 
Japan, Canada and 12 European countries including UK, Germany and France. With fresh data 
they also confirmed that no data snooping was behind their original U.S. findings. As a primary 
methodology they sorted stocks into decile portfolios based on their lagged returns excess of 
local country indexes. Resulting equally weighted combined 14 countries portfolio returns were 
smaller than their U.S. counterparts, but remained significant up to five-year formation periods. 
Value weighted returns were more volatile and less significant, probably because of the smaller 
sample size that emphasized the effect of few large companies.  
 
Keloharju, Linnainmaa and Nyberg (2016) proved the cross-sectional pattern to extend into 
commodities, stock market indexes and to several market anomalies. They show that rather than 
these return patterns being a factor in itself, individual securities aggregate seasonalities across 
factor characteristics. This explains the low correlation between seasonal returns and risk 
factors tested by Heston and Sadka. Seasonalities seem to originate largely from systematic 
factors as the strategies have high volatility and seasonal patterns can be observed from 
diversified portfolios. Further, different seasonal strategies correlate weakly to each other and 
do not link to macroeconomic variables. The article extends the financial literature by showing 
seasonal patterns to be of great economic significance and to exist near universally. It serves as 
the second key previous literature motivating my thesis.  
 
The authors confirm that seasonal patterns exist because of the same-calendar-month 
performance, as when the historical performance of the month is controlled the pattern 
practically disappears, excluding the first annual lag. They created well diversified portfolios 
based on same-calendar-month returns and other-than-same-calendar-month returns and found 
the results to endorse this view. Factor portfolios were also formed out of stocks exposed to 
firm characteristics that have been found to correlate on stock returns, such as size, book-to-
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value and dividend-to-price. Many of factor portfolios were exposed to seasonalities, but they 
were missing for example from the traditional momentum portfolio. 
 
Keloharju et al. note that seasonal winners-minus-losers strategies are exposed to high 
systematic risk as they find seasonal strategies considerably riskier than randomly generated 
ones. This further implies the connection of seasonalities to systematic factors. The authors 
noticed that seasonal strategies investing to factor portfolios (i.e. size, book-to-market etc.) 
explain a sizable amount of returns of a “general” seasonal strategy. Keloharju et. al then test 
returns of anomaly portfolios and notice many of them to follow seasonal pattern i.e. their 
earnings were dependable on calendar month. The effect remained, although weakened, after 
January was excluded from the analysis. The authors exploit these dependencies to create an 
anomaly-portfolio-trading metastrategy that is based on anomalies’ past same-calendar-month-
performance with an average monthly return of staggering 1.9%. Even more interestingly, a 
strategy trading anomalies based on their other-calendar-month performance yields negative 
returns. This suggests that other than the same-calendar-month performance of an anomaly is 
irrelevant to its returns in the cross-section of anomalies at a given month. They note that 
because of this, additional return anomalies can be identified by studying variables accosiated 
with return seasonalities. 
 
Next the authors test the exposure of seasonality to macroeconomic risks and investor sentiment 
but found evidence of neither. They proceed to test the robustness of the phenomena and find 
it persistent in the entire cross section of U.S stock returns and during different subperiods. 
Seasonalities were also found in commodities and in MSCI country indexes in three continents. 
Keloharju et al. also note that correlations between different seasonal strategies are low, 
suggesting that diversification benefits could easily be achieved to multi-strategy investor.  
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2.3.Seasonal firms-specific events 
 
Several firm-specific events have been proven to effect to the stock price of a company. For 
example, Loughran and Vijh (1997) found that firms that have completed an acquisition via 
cash settlement tend to outperform their peers while those that have acquired via stocks 
underperform. Both initial public offerings and seasonal public offerings have been found to 
have an effect to stock performance (e.g. Brav, Geczy and Gompers (2000) and Loughran and 
Ritter (1995). Many of these events are imbedded to the financial year of publicly listed 
company and most of them are associated with positive abnormal returns (Hartzmark and 
Solomon (2017). Earnings announcements and dividends have long been thought to be the two 
most important ways of releasing significant information about the state of the company’s state 
of affairs to the public (e.g. Aharony and Swary (1980).  Beaver (1968) discovered that stocks 
have abnormally large returns around earnings announcements. This earnings announcement 
premium has since been confirmed and studied further by e.g. Chari, Jagannathan and Ofer 
(1988) who found the pattern to effect only small companies and also noted that the volatility 
of the returns increased around earnings announcements.  
 
More recently Savor and Wilson (2016) were able to construct a long-short strategy buying 
earnings announcers and selling all other stocks with significant profits. They hypothesize that 
investors incorrectly adjust their earnings expectations for non-announcers through the 
announcements of other companies. This would increase the systematic risk of announcers and 
lead to a risk premium. Interestingly Chang, Hartzmark, Solomon and Soltes (2017) noticed 
that companies yield significant abnormal returns during months with an earnings 
announcement from a positive seasonality quarter. For example, for a retail store benefiting 
from Christmas shopping the said positive seasonality quarter would be the fourth. The authors 
hypothesise that investors overweight recent data and underestimate the predictable seasonal 
patterns in earnings.  
 
Dividends are another seasonal event for a publicly listed company. Michaely, Thaler and 
Womack (1995) find that dividend initiation announcements have a positive price impact while 
omissions have a contrary effect. They also state that reactions to dividend omission 
announcements are much larger in magnitude. However, Boehme and Sorin (2002) found that 
while post-dividend-announcement returns are abnormally positive when the abnormal returns 
are measured against equally weighted portfolios, they become insignificant when value 
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weighted benchmarks are used. Much of research on the effect of dividend announcement is 
concentrated to study the outcome of unexpected changes in dividends. The subject is also 
somewhat debated, as for example Watts (1973) founds unexpected changes in dividends to be 
trivial to future stock price while Aharony and Swary (1980) provide evidence on strong capital 
market reaction to dividend changes. Aside from the announcement reaction, Hartzmark and 
Solomon (2013) found that companies predicted to issue dividends in a given month have 
abnormally positive returns in that month. They hypothesize that this premium is caused by 
dividend-seeking investors buying stock before the ex-dividend date. Bessembinder and Zhang 
(2014) found that corporate distribution events, such as dividends and splits can be predicted 
as they are likely to occur on anniversaries of such events in the history of the individual 
company. They constructed a trading strategy long on stocks with predicted distribution events 
and achieved abnormally high returns. The authors state separately that the pattern cannot be 
explained by the annual seasonality found by Heston and Sadka (2008) 
 
Post-earnings-announcement-drift is one of the most notorious exploitable phenomena 
accosiated with company specific information releases. It was first discovered as early as 1968 
when Ball and Brown noted that stock prices do not fully react to earnings announcements, but 
that positive (negative) news start an upwards (downwards) drift of the abnormal returns of the 
stock.  Foster, Olsen and Shevlin (1984) constructed a trading strategy long (short) on stocks 
with large positive (negative) earnings surprises and achieved considerable abnormal returns. 
They also noted that this phenomenon affects small companies most heavily. 
 
Bernard and Thomas (1990) were able to predict both the sign and magnitude of future price 
reactions of quarterly earnings announcement up to one year ahead by using current and 
historical earnings announcement data. In addition to the positive correlation between the 
earnings surprise for a quarter and post-announcement drift for a next quarter, they found 
adverse correlation between an earnings surprise of a quarter and abnormal returns around the 
corresponding quarterly earnings announcement one year in the future. They hypothesize that 
traders’ future expectations of earnings equal that of comparable time last year. The authors 
also construct long-short portfolios based on stocks’ historical earnings announcement 
behaviour and achieve high abnormal returns 
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3. The Study and Hypotheses 
 
 
This section will first briefly discusses my personal motivation behind this academic study on 
quarterly seasonality. To help the reader to identify the concept behind the phenomenon, it will 
also graph results of cross-sectional regressions of past monthly returns to stock prices like my 
predecessors Heston and Sadka (2008) and Keloharju et al. (2016). I will then go through my 
three hypotheses that are initially supported by the results of cross-sectional regressions for this 
Thesis to investigate further. Lastly, I will address potential gains of this work to finance 
academia. 
 
Like many in the field of finance, I have always been intrigued by market inefficiencies and 
anomalies. After familiarizing myself with aggregating studies concerning equity market 
anomalies, like the excellent study by McLean and Pontiff (2016), I found to be most interested 
in the effect of past returns to stock price. This was because despite of it being full 25 research-
filled years from Jegadeesh and Titman’s original paper giving birth to the momentum 
phenomenon, the anomaly has sustained its spectacularly strong profitability. Inspired by 
previous research by Novy-Marx (2012) and Heston and Sadka (2008) I formed winners-minus-
losers portfolios based on returns of single past lagged returns from the most recent past month 
all the way up to 240th (unreported). The results of these individual-lagged-month portfolios 
encouraged me to investigate the effect of lagged quarters. 
 
Before further research, I will follow my predecessors Heston and Sadka (2008) and more 
recently Keloharju et. al. (2016) and calculate cross-sectional effect of past monthly returns to 
stock prices with Fama and MacBeth (1973) regressions  
 
𝑟𝑖,𝑡 =  𝛼𝑘,𝑡 +  𝛾𝑘,𝑡𝑟𝑖,𝑡−𝑘 +  𝑒𝑖,𝑡      || 𝑘𝜖[1,240] 
 
where 𝑟𝑖,𝑡 is the returns of an individual stock i at time t. Two abovementioned papers plotted 
the regression coefficients of the results, but I decided to concentrate on the t-values, which can 
be seen in Figure 1. Also different from my predecessors, I used the data from the entire period 
of existence of the CRPS database from 1926 to 2016 ergo, as the maximum number of lags 
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taken into account is 240 months, the first returns to be used as dependent variables of the first 
phase regression are from the January of 1946. 
 
Figure 1 - Effect of past months’ returns to stock price 
The figure plots t-statistics of Fama and MacBeth (1973) regressions of returns of month t against the returns of 
month t-k, ri,t =  αk,t + γk,tri,t−k + ei,t, where k 𝜖 [1,240]. The squares signify t-statistics of annual lags 
(k=12,24,36…) and circles nonannual quarterend lags (k=3,6,9,…). The regressions use monthly data from January 
1926 to December 2016 of U.S. stocks reported in CRSP database.   
 
 
 
 
As seen in the Figure 1 past annual lags (k=12,24,36,…), marked by squares, clearly stand out 
from the data as noted first by Heston and Sadka (2008). It is important to clarify that rather 
than stocks repeating systematic return shocks, this figure is caused by historical performance 
variation from month to month. For example, a stock that performs well in given December can 
be expected to continue to do so for a period extending as far as 20 years. 
 
The primary interest of this Thesis lies in the effect of quarterend lags (i.e. k=3,6,9,…), marked 
in the figure as circles (excluding annual quarterend lags abovementioned). The cross-sectional 
autocorrelation indeed seems to spike also in other quarterend lags than those in annual lags, 
although the effect is considerably more moderate. Therefore, my first hypothesis is 
 
Hypothesis 1 
There exists a significant quarterly-seasonality phenomenon in the stock market. In general, it 
is more profitable to invest based on stock’s quarterend-lag performance than based on its 
past returns in general. 
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When conducting a research towards this hypothesis, I have to ensure that the possible 
performance difference between investment strategies based on quarterend and non-quarterend 
lagged returns is not built on merely to the strong correlation between the stock returns and 
annual lags already well research by my predecessors. One possibly strategy would be to create 
portfolios based on nonannual quarterend lags. Confirming the hypothesis would not 
automatically signify that quarterend strategies would have historically been sensible 
investments and profitable after, for example, modest trading fees. Although such profit-
earning perspective is not the prime objective of this academic work, it is certainly a subject I 
will also address.  
 
When examining the Figure 1 further, one notices that quarterend lags seem to have particularly 
strong effect during the already-heavily-correlated first lagged year. This is noteworthy because 
much of the literature tackling the effect of past returns to stock price concentrates on the effect 
of these first 12 monthly lags. Traditional momentum strategy buys (sells) stocks that have 
performed well (badly) during past 2 to 12 months, leaving the most recent month out because 
of short-term reversal. As quarterend lags constitute four out of eleven months of the 
momentum phenomena, their contribution to its profits is (and should be) high. However, I am 
going to go little further and formulate my second hypothesis as 
 
Hypothesis 2 
Investment strategy based on quarterend lags (3,6,9 and 12) of the traditional momentum is 
preferable to a strategy based on all months (2:12). 
 
Preference in investment-sense here denotes better relation of risks and returns measured by the 
Sharpe ratio (Sharpe 1966) which is, in empirical standpoint, well measured by the t-value of 
the portfolio returns (Sharpe (1994).  
 
The average correlation of past returns drops after the first full year, as can be expected by the 
long-term reversal phenomenon. However, the difference between quarterly lags and non-
quarterly lags stays surprisingly strong even in more distant intervals. If we leave out the most 
recent past year, 67% of the quarterend lags have a correlation over zero to a stock return of a 
given month while only 22% of the non-quarterend lags hold that effect. Nonannual-quarterend 
lags have positive correlation in 56% of the cases thus the effect of the quarters does not seem 
to be entirely fuelled by the annual seasonality phenomena. When looking at the lagged years 
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2-5, the hearth of long-term reversal found by De Bondt and Thaler (1985), quarterly lags seem 
to persist quite well compared to other lags. Therefore, my third and final hypothesis is  
 
Hypothesis 3 
Quarterend lags do not contribute to the long-term returns reversal phenomenon found by De 
Bondt and Thaler (1985). 
 
The quarterly pattern visible in Figure 1 gives little clue of its underlying reasons, of which I 
will hope to at least partly uncover with my research on the subject. In addition to forming 
portfolios based on past returns, I have decided to use particular tests to ensure the robustness 
of my results and to hopefully also shed some light to the origin of the aforementioned pattern. 
Based on previous research on the matter and the nature of the fiscal year, my prime suspects 
are company-specific events, many of which encore in quarterly frequencies. Also, I will test 
the calendar distribution of the returns of my portfolios to see whether the returns are seasonally 
skewed towards a particular calendar period of the year.  
 
Were these three hypotheses to be proved correct by my research, they would bring new 
information about the effect of past returns to stock price. Finding a quarterly pattern could help 
us to better understand the cross-sectional seasonality and its underlying forces. This Thesis 
could also contribute to the research of long-term reversal literature: Were the quarterend lags 
found to be exempt of the effect, new potential explanations behind the reversal could arose. 
Practical, asset management related implications are not entirely out of question, if the 
quarterend strategies are found to be both feasible and practical investments historically. The 
most interesting aspect of my work, however, is related to the past intermediate horizon 
momentum. It is one of, if not the most prominent anomaly against CAPM and bringing new 
results of the possible forces behind it would be an accomplishment indeed.  
  
24 
4. Data and Methodology 
 
 
In this section I will first forgo the sources of data necessary for the analysis conducted in my 
work. Then I will concentrate on methodology used to obtain the results presented in this 
Thesis. My data consists primarily of time series of U.S. listed stock prices, stocks returns and 
amounts of shares outstanding and information about security-specific events including 
earnings announcements and dividend data. My primary research method is formation of 
monthly-updated portfolios based on past returns.   
 
 
4.1.Data 
 
My primary source of data is the Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP), which holds 
data of returns and various characteristics of U.S. stocks listed in NYSE, Amex and NASDAQ. 
Like many of my predecessors (for example Daniel & Moskowitz (2016) and Keloharju et al. 
(2016), I include exclusively ordinary common shares (CRSP code 10 or 11) to my sample. 
Monthly stock returns data is used from January 1926 to December 2016, consisting of 1092 
months. I use CRSP delisting returns to complete the stock returns data and take into account 
the effect of failing firms to my research. All together my returns sample, excluding particular 
occurrences addressed later in this chapter, consists of little over 2 million firm months. I 
decided to use returns free of dividends in my analysis, as companies issuing dividends on 
quarterly basis could create severe autocorrelation to my results. The effect of this decision is 
discussed further in this thesis.  
 
When doing a study which involves heavy portfolio formation, one must decide is whether to 
include  low-priced-stocks (“penny stocks”) and stocks with “tiny” market capitalization in my 
sample. In some studies, for example in Jegadeesh and Titman 2001, stock prices lower than 
$5 USD and securities belonging to the smallest size decile of the New York Stock Exchange 
have been excluded as Conrad and Kaul (1993) noticed that low-priced stocks contribute 
heavily to long-term reversal by exhibiting strong returns reversal in January. In their 2010 
paper Heston and Sadka did a liquidity control test while investigating the robustness of their 
international seasonality portfolio returns. They left out stocks priced smaller than equivalent 
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of $5 USD, belonging to smallest priced quarter of securities and stocks with bellow-median 
trading volume. The magnitude of returns of the seasonal winners-minus-losers portfolios 
decreased slightly but the distinctive return pattern did not disappear. I decided to exclude 
stocks priced less than $5 USD from my sample, as I felt that these often illiquid securities 
would not be suitable for a portfolio updated monthly. The small-cap stocks were kept in the 
sample to avoid data-snooping.  
 
I will primarily use value weighted portfolio returns, but include equal weighted returns as a 
robustness check for my prime results, giving an approximation of the effect of small 
capitalization stocks. For the value weighted portfolios, the equity value for a stock i at month 
𝑡 is calculated as 
 
𝐸𝑉𝑖,𝑡 = 𝑃𝑅𝐶𝑖,𝑡  ×  𝑆𝐻𝑅𝑂𝑈𝑇𝑖,𝑡  
 
where 𝑃𝑅𝐶 and 𝑆𝐻𝑅𝑂𝑈𝑇 are the stock’s monthly closing price and its number of shares 
outstanding from the CRSP database, respectively. The portfolios held during a month t are 
weighted based on the market capitalization of their participants at month t-1. 
 
For firm-specific-event-related robustness checks, I used CRSP data of dividend 
announcements and ex-dividend dates. Data of the announcement dates of quarterly earnings 
from Compustat was used and combined with my CRSP dataset using CRSP/Compustat 
Merged linked company permanent identification numbers. CRSP lists ex-dividend dates from 
the beginning of their dataset in 1926 and dividend announcement dates from 1962. Compustat 
data of earnings announcements starts from July of 1971, but I found the sample size of the first 
three months insufficient and decided to start using data from the October. For the sake of 
simplicity and comparability, all event portfolios use data only from October of 1971 onwards, 
leaving 543 months until the end of my examination period of December 2016. This is roughly 
half of the period of my stock prices and returns data. In addition to data on individual events, 
I created a dataset to study the combined effect of all events by merging the previously 
described event data series. In this combined set a firm was classified as an event-undergoing 
company at any given month where it encountered any of the abovementioned events. The 
number of different events beyond one undergone in a given month did not affect the status of 
the company but the division between event undergoers and non-undergoers was binary.  
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I calculated my portfolio returns also from a sample consisting exclusively large companies. I 
felt that this supplemented the results obtained by my actual robustness checks, especially in 
the case of equally weighted results. However, I decided to leave the results for Appendix for 
clearer structure of my work. To create a large-company-sample, I used NYSE size deciles 
obtained from Kenneth French’s data library. Companies smaller than the 5th NYSE size decile 
i.e. median size are excluded but the portfolios are compounded exactly like their full-sample 
peers. French’s data library was also used to obtain the monthly returns of traditional 
momentum portfolios based on past continuous months for a robustness-check purposes. 
 
 
4.2.Methodology 
 
The primary empirical vehicle of my research are returns from portfolios based on the 
performance of past returns. There are certain aspects to be decided on the portfolio 
constructing methodology. To calculate winners-minus-losers portfolios, one must first decide 
how to define the said winners and losers. The exact high and low breakpoints of factor 
characteristics differ from study to study. For example, Kenneth French constructs the 
traditional long-short momentum portfolio with 70th and 30th return percentiles in his data 
library, while Heston and Sadka (2008) and Daniel and Moskowitz (2016) use extreme deciles. 
McLean and Pontiff (2016), who use the high and low quintiles in their study, remark that 
momentum is an anomaly where higher characteristics exposure leads to higher returns. I 
decided to use deciles as a basis of my approach as I hope that performance variation among 
deciles might bring further light to the phenomenon I am researching.  
 
Another question is whether to use equal-weighted or value-weighted returns. Again, there is 
no unanimous opinion in the literature on matter. McLean and Pontiff (2016) noted that in their 
sample of 79 anomaly-related studies all but one used primarily equal-weighted returns. Heston 
and Sadka (2008) also primarily use equal weighting methodology, but note that the annual 
seasonality pattern is present in both weighting methods. Kenneth French uses value weighted 
returns of 6 portfolios for his momentum factor. I decided to use value weighted portfolios as 
my primary approach but also to calculate comparative results from equal weighted portfolios 
to brought additional level of analysis to my study. The weighting of the portfolio held at a 
given month t is done according to equity values of month t-1. 
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The formation process of portfolios is rather straight-forward. The stocks are divided into ten 
decile portfolios based on their performance of the given past months. The portfolios are 
updated monthly. Returns of a losers portfolio i.e. the portfolio formed from the stocks that 
have performed worse than 90% of the sample of stocks during the lagged months in which a 
given strategy is based is subtracted from the winners portfolio consisting of the best performed 
10%, to create a zero-investment winners-minus-losers (W-L) portfolio. The stocks are selected 
to portfolios based on average monthly returns instead of cumulative returns. This approach, 
used e.g. by Heston and Sadka (2008) is more reasonable as majority of my portfolios are based 
on discontinuous months (i.e. months t-3,6,9,12). To sustain comparability of the results this 
method is also used with portfolios constructed based on continuous months i.e. the full first 
year strategy (months t-1:12). Because of this, my results of the traditional momentum portfolio 
differ from ones calculated based on cumulative returns.  
 
To be included in a portfolio at a time t a stock must have a valid return at time t and also an 
equity value at time t-1 for value weighting purposes. To ensure full comparability, stock to be 
accepted into equal weighted portfolio must still have valid equity value for month t-1, even if 
this value is not used in the weighting process whatsoever. Unlike some studies, for example 
Daniel and Moskowitz (2016), I demand that the security must have valid return data for all the 
past months used as a basis on construction of a portfolio in question. I know that this 
requirement reduces my sample, especially with event portfolios discussed below, but I feel 
this to be necessary because of the non-continuous nature of my formation strategies. All stocks 
fulfilling these criteria are included into one of the decile portfolios to evade data snooping 
biases as well as possible. 
 
To test the robustness of my results, the portfolios are tested against the effects of earnings 
announcements, dividend announcements and ex-dividend dates. These tests are familiar from 
my predecessors, Heston and Sadka (2008). For each month, two versions of winner and losers 
portfolios are formed: one built on exclusively stocks with said event occurring during the 
portfolio holding period and another where such stocks are excluded. This will give an 
approximation of the effect of these events to my results. In event portfolios, the used stock 
return data is also restricted to companies that report data of the event in question. For example, 
out of 20360 companies that reported returns from October 1971 onwards, 18560 (92%) had 
earnings announcement data available.  
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In addition to portfolio construction, Fama and MacBeth regressions (1973) were used to 
calculate cross-sectional effect of past monthly returns to stock price. I ran cross-sectional 
univariate regressions on the returns of month t against months t-k where 𝑘𝜖[1,240] for all the 
months t, and then took an average regression estimates and standard errors of each k to examine 
the correlation of past months’ returns to stock price. As my returns data starts from January 
1926 and I have chosen to examine correlations from lagged 20 years, the regressions are 
performed from January 1946 onwards, covering 852 months. This is also the calculation period 
of my portfolio returns excluding the event portfolios. 
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5. Results 
 
 
This section presents the results of my Thesis. I will first go through my primary results, the 
returns of decile portfolios of quarterend strategies compared to those based on other lags. Then 
I will ensure the originality of the results obtained by leaving out previously investigated annual 
lags from the portfolios and by testing alternative portfolio weighting methodology. Further 
robustness checks will also be done by investigating the possible effect of firm-specific seasonal 
events have to my results.  I will then compare the quarterend strategy to traditional momentum 
portfolio. Finally, the returns of quarterend strategies during individual calendar months is 
presented. 
 
 
5.1.Quarterend portfolios 
 
My prime results are decile portfolios based on past quarterend returns. I will compare their 
performance against portfolios made of non-quarterly lags of selected formation intervals; 
portfolios formed based on all lags are also shown as benchmark. This style of presentation of 
the results is familiar from Heston and Sadka (2008). For example, in a given month t the 
Quarterend strategy portfolios of the formation interval Year 1 is built based on the 
performance of stocks in months t-3, t-6, t-9 and t-12. Average returns of decile portfolios of 
all strategies are presented, W (winners) signifying portfolios consisting of stocks that have had 
an average performance higher than 90% of their peers during the given lags, while L (losers) 
have performed worse than 90% of their peers. W-L portfolio is calculated in each month simply 
by subtracting the returns of losers from the winners, creating a market neutral zero-investment 
portfolio.   
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Table 1 - Portfolios based on past returns 
In a given month t, U.S. stocks reported in CRSP database are grouped into ten portfolios based on their past performance, top decile belonging to winner (W) and low decile 
to loser (L) portfolios. For example, the Quarterend strategy of Year 1 is based on returns of months t-3, t-6, t-9 and t-12 while the All strategy of the same interval is based on 
months from t-1 to t-12. Winners-minus-losers portfolio (W-L) is created every month by subtracting the returns of losers from winners. Portfolios are updated monthly and 
average value weighted returns (in percent) and t-statics (in brackets) of all strategies are calculated from January 1946 to December 2016 (852 months). 
 
Strategy   W 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 L  W-L 
               
 All  1.24% 0.96% 0.89% 0.72% 0.62% 0.61% 0.53% 0.58% 0.48% 0.46%  0.78% 
   [5.7] [5.6] [5.6] [4.9] [4.4] [4.2] [3.7] [3.7] [2.7] [2.0]  [3.6] 
Year 1 Quarterend  1.39% 1.12% 0.96% 0.70% 0.76% 0.66% 0.51% 0.42% 0.34% 0.14%  1.25% 
   [6.6] [6.5] [6.3] [4.8] [5.3] [4.8] [3.5] [2.8] [2.0] [0.7]  [7.3] 
 Non-quarterend  1.02% 0.79% 0.67% 0.61% 0.63% 0.69% 0.64% 0.72% 0.70% 0.77%  0.25% 
   [4.8] [4.6] [4.3] [4.2] [4.4] [4.9] [4.3] [4.5] [3.9] [3.5]  [1.2] 
               
 All  0.76% 0.73% 0.72% 0.70% 0.75% 0.71% 0.70% 0.85% 0.80% 0.95%  -0.18% 
   [3.5] [4.1] [4.5] [4.7] [5.2] [5.0] [5.0] [5.7] [5.4] [5.1]  [-1.1] 
Year 2 Quarterend  1.02% 0.83% 0.82% 0.76% 0.68% 0.68% 0.60% 0.56% 0.64% 0.64%  0.38% 
   [5.0] [4.9] [5.1] [5.2] [4.8] [4.8] [4.2] [3.9] [4.2] [3.5]  [2.8] 
 Non-quarterend  0.60% 0.62% 0.68% 0.65% 0.69% 0.71% 0.77% 0.80% 0.96% 1.18%  -0.58% 
   [2.8] [3.5] [4.3] [4.4] [4.8] [4.9] [5.4] [5.4] [6.1] [6.7]  [-3.6] 
               
 All  0.76% 0.69% 0.74% 0.76% 0.68% 0.66% 0.63% 0.76% 0.83% 0.98%  -0.22% 
   [3.6] [4.0] [4.7] [5.1] [4.7] [4.7] [4.4] [5.3] [5.5] [5.6]  [-1.5] 
Year 3 Quarterend  1.01% 0.90% 0.79% 0.78% 0.74% 0.62% 0.60% 0.51% 0.57% 0.65%  0.36% 
   [5.0] [5.2] [5.1] [5.2] [5.2] [4.4] [4.3] [3.5] [3.7] [3.7]  [3.0] 
 Non-quarterend  0.66% 0.64% 0.58% 0.63% 0.70% 0.69% 0.78% 0.81% 0.97% 1.11%  -0.45% 
   [3.1] [3.7] [3.8] [4.3] [4.9] [4.9] [5.5] [5.6] [6.2] [6.3]  [-3.3] 
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Strategy   W 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 L  W-L 
               
 All  0.85% 0.85% 0.69% 0.66% 0.68% 0.65% 0.73% 0.68% 0.67% 0.88%  -0.02% 
   [4.2] [4.9] [4.4] [4.5] [4.8] [4.5] [5.0] [4.6] [4.5] [5.2]  [-0.2] 
Year 4 Quarterend  1.02% 0.85% 0.91% 0.69% 0.64% 0.65% 0.62% 0.60% 0.53% 0.58%  0.44% 
   [5.2] [5.1] [5.8] [4.7] [4.5] [4.5] [4.5] [4.2] [3.5] [3.3]  [3.6] 
 Non-quarterend  0.72% 0.73% 0.63% 0.65% 0.64% 0.72% 0.72% 0.79% 0.85% 0.98%  -0.26% 
   [3.6] [4.3] [4.1] [4.3] [4.5] [5.0] [5.0] [5.4] [5.7] [5.7]  [-2.1] 
               
 All  0.85% 0.72% 0.70% 0.70% 0.66% 0.66% 0.71% 0.70% 0.70% 0.83%  0.03% 
   [4.2] [4.3] [4.5] [4.7] [4.5] [4.7] [5.0] [4.9] [4.8] [4.8]  [0.2] 
Year 5 Quarterend  0.95% 0.86% 0.88% 0.84% 0.74% 0.65% 0.53% 0.54% 0.55% 0.63%  0.31% 
   [4.9] [5.2] [5.7] [5.6] [5.2] [4.6] [3.8] [3.7] [3.6] [3.6]  [2.6] 
 Non-quarterend  0.70% 0.58% 0.69% 0.59% 0.67% 0.67% 0.75% 0.87% 0.84% 0.97%  -0.28% 
   [3.5] [3.4] [4.5] [4.0] [4.7] [4.7] [5.2] [6.0] [5.7] [5.7]  [-2.3] 
               
 All  0.78% 0.63% 0.71% 0.64% 0.61% 0.73% 0.61% 0.78% 0.70% 0.96%  -0.18% 
   [3.9] [3.8] [4.5] [4.2] [4.1] [5.1] [4.4] [5.7] [5.1] [6.2]  [-1.3] 
Years 6-10 Quarterend  1.04% 0.94% 0.75% 0.74% 0.75% 0.69% 0.64% 0.54% 0.36% 0.31%  0.73% 
   [5.5] [5.7] [4.9] [5.0] [5.1] [4.9] [4.6] [3.7] [2.5] [2.0]  [5.8] 
 Non-quarterend  0.62% 0.48% 0.51% 0.51% 0.61% 0.71% 0.82% 0.86% 0.79% 1.12%  -0.51% 
   [3.2] [2.9] [3.3] [3.5] [4.3] [4.8] [5.8] [6.2] [5.6] [7.3]  [-3.8] 
               
 All  0.71% 0.78% 0.72% 0.67% 0.62% 0.61% 0.69% 0.75% 0.63% 0.75%  -0.04% 
   [4.1] [5.0] [4.9] [4.6] [4.3] [4.0] [4.7] [5.2] [4.3] [4.6]  [-0.3] 
Years 11-15 Quarterend  0.83% 0.81% 0.73% 0.83% 0.68% 0.55% 0.68% 0.57% 0.49% 0.39%  0.45% 
   [5.0] [5.4] [5.0] [5.6] [4.7] [4.0] [4.7] [3.8] [3.3] [2.5]  [4.2] 
 Non-quarterend  0.55% 0.59% 0.72% 0.65% 0.67% 0.72% 0.68% 0.66% 0.74% 0.88%  -0.33% 
   [3.3] [3.9] [4.7] [4.4] [4.7] [5.0] [4.7] [4.6] [4.9] [5.7]  [-3.1] 
               
 All  0.71% 0.62% 0.70% 0.65% 0.63% 0.65% 0.70% 0.67% 0.51% 0.81%  -0.10% 
   [4.2] [4.0] [4.7] [4.4] [4.3] [4.6] [4.9] [4.8] [3.6] [5.1]  [-0.8] 
Years 16-20 Quarterend  0.75% 0.79% 0.75% 0.77% 0.70% 0.65% 0.63% 0.50% 0.46% 0.46%  0.29% 
   [4.6] [5.1] [5.1] [5.2] [4.9] [4.6] [4.3] [3.5] [3.2] [2.8]  [2.6] 
 Non-quarterend  0.60% 0.64% 0.66% 0.61% 0.53% 0.71% 0.55% 0.74% 0.80% 0.84%  -0.24% 
   [3.5] [4.0] [4.5] [4.2] [3.5] [5.0] [3.9] [5.2] [5.5] [5.3]  [-2.1] 
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Encouraged by the Figure 1, I decided to concentrate on short and intermediate portfolio 
formation intervals. Out of eight intervals I have selected for the study, five are based on the 
performance of a lagged individual year, starting from the most recent. Longer formation 
periods are divided into three strategies, intervals of years 6-10, 11-15 and 16-20. My principal 
point on interest is the lagged first year, as much of the academic research concerning the effect 
of past returns is concentrated on these most recent 12 lagged months. I decided to address the 
first five past years individually as many research on the effect of long-term reversal, for 
example that of De Bondt and Thaler’s (1985), deals with lags up to five years. The long scope 
of 20 years in total was selected in the spirit of previous seasonality literature (Heston and Sadka 
(2008) and Keloharju et al. (2016). The intervals of 10-15 and 16-20 also serve as a good 
reference as the quarterly pattern shown in Figure 1 seems to decay during this time.  
 
Data from the year 1926 onwards is used (the start of CRSP database). The longest formation 
period extends to lagged 20 year returns and to sustain the comparability of the results, all 
portfolios are formed and average returns calculated from the year 1946 onwards. Average 
returns and t-statistics of decile portfolios are presented in Table 1. The results look promising. 
Quarterend strategies outperform other strategies at all formation intervals. Despite of the long-
term reversal effect, the returns of quarterend strategies remain significantly positive thorough 
the lagged 20 years. When intercepting this finding it is important to keep in mind that I have 
removed stocks priced less than $5 USD which, according to Conrad and Kaul (1993), will 
reduce the effect of long-term reversal. W-L portfolios formed based on all months earn positive 
returns on first year and negative returns in longer lags (with the exception of Year 5), as one 
would expect based on previous returns of the momentum phenomena and long-term reversal. 
The magnitude of my results seems plausible when compared to those of previous literature. 
 
As expected by the previous literature on the effect of past returns, all W-L strategies based on 
the most recent past year are positive. However, the magnitude of spread between quarterend 
and non-quarterend returns is striking, 1.00 percentage point per month i.e. the spread is larger 
than the profits of a strategy based on the full past year. The differences in t-values, signifying 
portfolio Sharpe -ratios (Sharpe (1994), are even more prominent: quarterend strategy’s t-value 
of 7.3 is large compared to those of all lags (3.6) and non-quarterend lags (1.2). In fact, the t-
value of non-quarterend portfolio is not significant in commonly used parameters, although it 
must be kept in mind that the performance of both full one-year portfolio and non-quarterend 
portfolio are probably heavily affected by the short-term reversal, the effect of the most recent 
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monthly lag. Quarterend months seem to have a huge impact on the returns of strategies trading 
stocks based on their past-year-performance and furthermore, investing into stocks that have 
performed well in past 4 quarters seem to be more lucrative and less risky than on investing 
based on past 12 months.   
 
The profitability of all W-L strategies decays in longer lags, as can be expected by Figure 1 and 
the long-term reversal phenomena. The quarterend strategy, however, remains significantly 
positive on 5% level on all formation intervals. There is surprisingly little deviation in the 
profits of the quarterend strategies in individual years 2-5. The returns of W-L portfolios based 
on all lags are not significantly negative in any formation period. This seems to be because of 
the effect of quarterend lags, however, as non-quarterend portfolios indeed are all significantly 
negative after the first year. It is important to take into account, that the survivorship bias 
increases in longer portfolio intervals, like noted by Heston and Sadka (2008). Only selected 
companies will ever have a return history of 20 years. This effect is diluted by my large sample 
size consisting of all common stocks in the CRSP data with exceptions mentioned in the Data 
section of this thesis. The effect is presumably more significant in the early years of the period 
of my portfolio returns calculation, because of the smaller number of companies.  
 
When looking at the performance of individual deciles beyond W and L portfolios, one notices 
that returns of quarterend portfolios follow a distinctive decreasing pattern when moving from 
winner deciles to loser ones with only some exceptions. The differences in t-values are 
somewhat broader, but clearly follow similar pattern. The patterns are near perfectly reversed 
when non-quarterend strategies are observed, last deciles performing better than winners. The 
Year 1 of Non-quarterend strategy makes an exception by having little apparent pattern besides 
the superior performance of the winner portfolio. This may be because of the strength of the 
intermediate-term momentum phenomena.  
 
These results crave for a series of further research and robustness checks. Annual lags are 
previously proved to hold a significant effect to stock price and they are thus affecting the 
returns of my quarterend portfolios. That quarterend strategies outperforming others could in 
fact be nothing but a diluted echo of the effect of annual lags. I will continue this Thesis by 
forming quarterend portfolios that exclude the said annual lags to research whether quarterly 
lags hold an effect of their own. I am also interested in how does my selected portfolio allocation 
method, weighting based on market capitalization, affect to the results. I will calculate equal 
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weighted returns out of my quarterend portfolios to investigate this matter and to supplement 
my value weighted results.  
 
Some firm-specific, seasonal events will almost certainly hold an effect to my results, most 
important of these being quarterly earnings-announcements, dividend-announcements and ex-
dividend dates. In the spirit of Heston and Sadka (2008) I will compare portfolios built with 
event and non-event stocks to isolate the effect of these occurrences. Finally, the results seen 
here encourage for further research on the traditional momentum phenomena. As Year 1 
strategies All and Non-quarterend computed here take into account the most recent annual lag, 
they are exposed to short-term reversal effect thus further investigation on the matter require a 
portfolio based on lags 2-12 to be computed. This is done later in my thesis. 
 
 
5.2.Effect of annual lags 
 
Although my results are encouraging, one will easily wonder how much of the quarterly 
seasonality can be explained by the annual lags already well research by Heston and Sadka 
(2008) and Keloharju et al. (2016). To distinguish the portion of the returns of lagged quarters 
I created nonannual quarterend strategies for all formation intervals. For example, the Year 1 
nonannual quarterend strategy winners-minus-losers portfolio buys (sells) stocks that have 
performed well (badly) in lagged months 3, 6 and 9. Table 2 shows the resulting average returns 
and t-statistics of the decile portfolios in all eight formation intervals. The data and 
methodology are identical to those of earlier results. 
 
As could be expected from the Figure 1, the average returns of all W-L portfolios decrease when 
annual lags are omitted. However, returns of my principal point of interest, the portfolio based 
on nonannual quarterends of the first year, will remain significantly positive.  The spread of 
monthly profits versus the full quarterend strategy is 23 basis points. Remarkably, the 
nonannual quarterend strategies still outperform strategies based on all months, including 
annual lags, in every single formation period. Decile portfolio comparison of nonannual 
quarterend strategies reveals patterns very similar to full quarterend strategies. It comes to no 
surprise that none of the other individual year strategies yield significantly positive winners-
minus-losers portfolio. Then, one could be surprised that none of the W-L strategies of the years 
2-5 have negative average returns either! Indeed, it seems that lagged quarters do not contribute 
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to long-term reversal effect reported by De Bondt and Thaler (1985). This finding strongly 
supports my Hypothesis 3 and I consider it to be one of the most prominent findings of my 
Thesis and an excellent topic for further research.  
 
Table 2 – Nonannual quarterend portfolios 
In a given month t, U.S. stocks reported in CRSP database are grouped into ten portfolios based on their past 
nonannual quarterend performance, top decile belonging to winner (W) and low decile to loser (L) portfolios. For 
example, the Year 2 strategy is based on returns of months t-15, t-18 and t-21. Winners-minus-losers portfolio (W-
L) is created every month by subtracting the returns of losers from winners. Portfolios are updated monthly and 
average value weighted returns (in percent) and t-statics (in brackets) of all strategies are calculated from January 
1946 to December 2016 (852 months). 
 
Strategy  W 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 L  W-L 
              
Year 1  1.32% 1.05% 0.85% 0.74% 0.72% 0.63% 0.64% 0.49% 0.39% 0.30%  1.02% 
  [6.3] [6.1] [5.4] [5.2] [5.1] [4.4] [4.5] [3.2] [2.2] [1.5]  [5.9] 
              
Year 2  0.80% 0.81% 0.72% 0.80% 0.71% 0.69% 0.65% 0.69% 0.63% 0.79%  0.01% 
  [3.9] [4.7] [4.7] [5.4] [5.0] [4.9] [4.6] [4.7] [4.0] [4.3]  [0.1] 
              
Year 3  0.92% 0.79% 0.83% 0.74% 0.73% 0.68% 0.59% 0.60% 0.51% 0.83%  0.09% 
  [4.6] [4.7] [5.2] [5.0] [5.1] [4.8] [4.1] [4.0] [3.3] [4.7]  [0.7] 
              
Year 4  0.88% 0.86% 0.80% 0.70% 0.63% 0.73% 0.67% 0.62% 0.62% 0.70%  0.18% 
  [4.4] [5.2] [5.2] [4.8] [4.4] [5.2] [4.7] [4.2] [3.9] [3.9]  [1.5] 
              
Year 5  0.85% 0.82% 0.78% 0.79% 0.71% 0.74% 0.61% 0.51% 0.60% 0.70%  0.15% 
  [4.4] [4.9] [5.2] [5.4] [4.9] [5.1] [4.3] [3.5] [3.8] [4.0]  [1.2] 
              
Years 6-10  0.86% 0.80% 0.67% 0.72% 0.73% 0.74% 0.61% 0.72% 0.49% 0.53%  0.33% 
  [4.7] [4.8] [4.3] [4.9] [5.0] [5.2] [4.3] [5.0] [3.4] [3.4]  [2.8] 
              
Years 11-15  0.84% 0.60% 0.83% 0.70% 0.63% 0.71% 0.55% 0.61% 0.53% 0.62%  0.22% 
  [4.9] [4.0] [5.7] [4.8] [4.3] [4.8] [3.8] [4.1] [3.5] [4.0]  [2.0] 
              
Years 16-20  0.64% 0.75% 0.75% 0.70% 0.67% 0.58% 0.61% 0.60% 0.53% 0.66%  -0.02% 
  [3.8] [4.8] [5.0] [4.8] [4.6] [4.1] [4.3] [4.2] [3.6] [4.1]  [-0.1] 
 
 
The W-L portfolios of strategies 6-10 and 11-15 yield significantly positive returns even when 
the annual lags have been removed from the analysis. This finding is surprising and cannot be 
explained by the survivorship bias as the 16-20 strategy yields returns close to zero. I find no 
apparent explanation for this other than the result seems plausible when examining the cross-
sectional correlations in Figure 1. Altogether, it seems that the quarterly seasonality is a 
phenomenon at least partly independent from annual seasonality in the stock market. On the 
other hand, I find it reasonable to hypothesize that there exists an autocorrelation between the 
two seasonality patterns, i.e. also a part of annual seasonality can be explained by quarterend 
return pattern.   
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5.3.Equally weighted returns 
 
I am interested about the effect of my chosen portfolio weighting method to my results. Heston 
and Sadka (2008) noticed that the long-term reversal had some more affect to equal weighted 
strategies but the results of annual seasonality portfolios stayed within the same magnitude in 
both equal and value weighted.  The Table 3 lists decile portfolio average returns and t-statistics 
of equally weighted quarterend portfolios. All other factors concerning the data and 
methodology are identical to Table 1.  
 
Table 3 - Equally weighted portfolios based on quarterend lags 
In a given month t, U.S. stocks reported in CRSP database are grouped into ten portfolios based on their past 
performance, top decile belonging to winner (W) and low decile to loser (L) portfolios. For example, the Year 1 
strategy is based on returns of months t-3, t-6, t-9 and t-12. Winners-minus-losers portfolio (W-L) is created every 
month by subtracting the returns of losers from winners. Portfolios are updated monthly; stocks are given equal 
weights and average returns (in percent) and t-statics (in brackets) of all strategies are calculated from January 
1946 to December 2016 (852 months). 
 
Strategy  W 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 L  W-L 
              
Year 1  1.58% 1.34% 1.22% 1.09% 0.99% 0.93% 0.89% 0.80% 0.74% 0.70%  0.88% 
  [7.4] [7.5] [7.5] [7.1] [6.5] [6.2] [5.8] [5.0] [4.2] [3.3]  [7.0] 
              
Year 2  1.29% 1.23% 1.14% 1.07% 1.07% 1.00% 0.99% 0.99% 1.07% 1.34%  -0.04% 
  [6.2] [6.9] [6.8] [6.8] [6.9] [6.6] [6.4] [6.4] [6.3] [6.7]  [-0.5] 
              
Year 3  1.44% 1.27% 1.16% 1.10% 1.06% 1.04% 1.03% 1.02% 1.07% 1.37%  0.07% 
  [6.9] [7.0] [7.1] [7.0] [6.9] [6.9] [6.8] [6.5] [6.4] [6.9]  [0.8] 
              
Year 4  1.48% 1.28% 1.18% 1.12% 1.03% 1.04% 1.03% 1.03% 1.07% 1.33%  0.15% 
  [7.2] [7.3] [7.2] [7.1] [6.7] [6.8] [6.8] [6.6] [6.4] [6.9]  [1.9] 
              
Year 5  1.41% 1.21% 1.18% 1.13% 1.07% 1.05% 0.99% 1.05% 1.05% 1.37%  0.04% 
  [7.1] [7.0] [7.2] [7.1] [7.0] [7.0] [6.5] [6.6] [6.3] [7.2]  [0.5] 
              
Years 6-10  1.43% 1.17% 1.06% 1.00% 1.02% 0.95% 0.92% 0.93% 0.86% 0.81%  0.62% 
  [7.6] [7.0] [6.8] [6.5] [6.8] [6.5] [6.2] [6.2] [5.5] [4.9]  [7.8] 
              
Years 11-15  1.22% 1.09% 1.03% 1.03% 0.97% 0.91% 0.97% 0.89% 0.79% 0.86%  0.36% 
  [7.1] [6.7] [6.6] [6.7] [6.4] [6.0] [6.5] [5.8] [5.2] [5.3]  [5.2] 
              
Years 16-20  1.10% 1.02% 0.97% 0.94% 0.93% 0.86% 0.87% 0.82% 0.82% 0.77%  0.33% 
  [6.4] [6.4] [6.2] [6.3] [6.2] [5.8] [5.8] [5.3] [5.4] [4.6]  [4.3] 
 
 
All average returns of equally weighted W-L portfolios are smaller than their value weighted 
peers, with the exception of formation interval 16-20 years. The differences are large in 
magnitude, especially in intervals longer than one year. Indeed, out of individual year portfolios 
after the Year 1, only the Year 4 portfolio has returns statistically significant at even 10% level. 
The returns of longer interval W-L portfolios are again remarkably significant. When taking 
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into account the strong annual seasonality in equal weighted portfolios proved by my 
predecessors, nonannual quarterend lags unlikely hold little explanatory power. The average 
returns of the Year 1, the point of highest interest in this Thesis, are smaller in equally weighted 
portfolios, 88 bps monthly compares to 125 bps in value weighted. However, the equally 
weighted portfolio also has considerably smaller standard error, leading to the t-value on 7.0 
which is comparable to 7.3 of the value weighted strategy. This is not only true for the Year 1 
results, but the standard errors of W-L portfolios of equal weighted strategies are all smaller 
than their value weighted peers. The finding is reasonable, as the returns of value weighted 
portfolios are more exposed to single large companies.  
 
Analysis of the decile portfolios reveals that the relatively weaker performance of equal 
weighted W-L portfolios is result of better performance of equal weighted portfolios overall. 
Every equal weighted winner portfolio performs better than its value weighted peer, but so do 
the equal weighted loser portfolios and in fact every single comparable decile portfolio, leading 
to ultimately smaller returns of zero-investment portfolios. It is strange that the equally 
weighted W-L portfolios at longer formation intervals of 6-20 years actually have t-values 
remarkably stronger than their value weighted peers while the individual year portfolios 
through 2-5 are so much weaker. Finding an exhaustive explanation to this is hard with my 
methodology, but it could be that the survivorship bias mentioned by Heston and Sadka is 
stronger in small cap stocks. 
 
By these results it seems that quarterly seasonality affects weaker to small stocks. This finding 
is interesting and I will further analyse it in the Discussion chapter of this work. In despite of 
this oddity, the returns of Year 1 W-L portfolio are promising. I decided to include also equally 
weighted returns into the more thorough analysis of the first lagged year later in this chapter to 
further investigate the effect of the weighting method to my most important results.  
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5.4.Firm-specific events 
 
I will perform an analysis similar to Heston and Sadka (2008) to control the effects of quarterly 
earnings announcement, dividend announcements and ex-dividend dates to my results.  
Compustat data of company earnings announcements and CRSP data of dividend 
announcement and ex-dividend dates are used from October 1971 and decile portfolio returns 
are calculated from October 1976 onwards to obtain the average returns of the strategies. In 
addition to these thee individual event tests, I test the pooled effect of all the three events with 
a combined dataset. On every month, two versions of all the event portfolios are formed: one 
with only companies undergoing the said event, e.g. an earnings announcement in the given 
month (an event portfolio) and another where event-undergoing companies are excluded from 
the portfolio formation (a nonevent portfolio). In the combined all-event portfolios, companies 
undergoing any of the three events are classified as an event undergoes. The company samples 
are limited to firms that report said event in question to ensure comparability. 
 
I think that these robustness checks are even more important for the quarterend portfolios than 
they are when researching the annual seasonality. Earnings announcements are a quarterly event 
by definition and dividends are usually issued by quarterly intervals by U.S. companies (e.g. 
Ferris, Noronha and Unlu (2010) report that 87% of U.S. companies in their sample pay 
dividends on quarterly frequency). Therefore, I decided to include the event and non-event 
strategy comparison not only for my quarterend strategies but also for all lags and non-
quarterend lags-based strategies. Like Heston and Sadka (2008), I do not report the results of 
each decile portfolio but only the results of W-L portfolios of event and nonevent strategies. 
This is done for the sake of structure of my work. I chose to include these event robustness 
checks only from the first five portfolio formation intervals (i.e. the five most recent individual 
years), omitting the longest three. I expect the possible effects of the events to be visibly enough 
for necessary assumptions to be made from these results.  The average returns and t-statistics 
of W-L portfolios are presented in Table 4. 
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Table 4 - Portfolios controlling for firm-specific events 
In a given month t, U.S. stocks that have returns reported in CRSP database and event-specific information 
available in CRSP/Compustat are grouped into ten portfolios based on their past performance, top decile belonging 
to winner and low decile to loser portfolios. For example, the Quarterend strategy of Year 1 is based on returns of 
months t-3, t-6, t-9 and t-12 while the All strategy of the same interval is based on months from t-1 to t-12. Event 
(nonevent) portfolios consists of companies that undergo (do not undergo) the said event on month t. Only the 
returns of winners-minus-losers portfolios are presented. They are created every month by subtracting the returns 
of losers from winners. Portfolios are updated monthly and average value weighted returns (in percent) and t-
statics (in brackets) of event and nonevent portfolios are calculated from October 1976 to December 2016 (483 
months). 
 
  
 Earnings 
announcement 
 Dividend 
announcement 
 
Ex dividend day 
 
All events       
              
Strategy   event nonevent  event nonevent  event nonevent  event nonevent 
              
 All  0.64% 0.67%  0.54% 0.69%  0.36% 0.73%  0.33% 0.78% 
   [1.6] [2.0]  [1.8] [2.0]  [1.1] [2.2]  [1.0] [2.3] 
Year 1 Quarterend  1.05% 1.06%  1.11% 1.16%  1.03% 1.08%  1.04% 1.00% 
   [3.2] [3.9]  [4.4] [4.1]  [3.8] [4.0]  [3.8] [3.4] 
 Non-quarterend -0.26% 0.43%  0.10% 0.31%  -0.06% 0.36%  -0.11% 0.45% 
   [-0.7] [1.5]  [0.4] [1.0]  [-0.2] [1.2]  [-0.4] [1.4] 
              
 All  0.08% -0.01%  0.07% -0.19%  0.23% -0.18%  0.13% -0.13% 
   [0.2] [-0.0]  [0.3] [-0.8]  [1.0] [-0.7]  [0.6] [-0.5] 
Year 2 Quarterend  0.46% 0.08%  0.16% 0.18%  0.58% -0.01%  0.46% -0.09% 
   [1.6] [0.4]  [0.7] [0.8]  [2.5] [-0.0]  [2.1] [-0.4] 
 Non-quarterend -0.46% -0.36%  -0.23% -0.57%  0.00% -0.56%  -0.35% -0.30% 
   [-1.5] [-1.5]  [-1.0] [-2.3]  [-0.0] [-2.3]  [-1.5] [-1.2] 
              
 All  -0.88% -0.11%  0.09% -0.30%  0.40% -0.40%  -0.11% -0.28% 
   [-2.9] [-0.5]  [0.4] [-1.4]  [1.8] [-1.9]  [-0.5] [-1.2] 
Year 3 Quarterend  -0.42% 0.28%  0.34% 0.10%  0.38% 0.04%  0.05% 0.28% 
   [-1.5] [1.5]  [1.5] [0.6]  [1.7] [0.2]  [0.2] [1.3] 
 Non-quarterend -0.93% -0.17%  -0.08% -0.41%  0.28% -0.56%  -0.53% -0.27% 
   [-3.1] [-0.9]  [-0.4] [-1.9]  [1.2] [-2.7]  [-2.5] [-1.2] 
              
 All  0.12% 0.16%  -0.04% 0.06%  0.43% -0.13%  0.11% 0.02% 
   [0.4] [0.7]  [-0.1] [0.3]  [1.9] [-0.6]  [0.5] [0.1] 
Year 4 Quarterend  0.13% 0.66%  0.35% 0.48%  0.88% 0.28%  0.50% 0.62% 
   [0.5] [3.2]  [1.5] [2.6]  [4.1] [1.5]  [2.4] [2.8] 
 Non-quarterend 0.06% -0.19%  -0.12% -0.10%  0.24% -0.29%  0.03% 0.03% 
   [0.2] [-1.0]  [-0.5] [-0.5]  [1.1] [-1.4]  [0.1] [0.1] 
              
 All  0.07% 0.15%  -0.17% -0.02%  0.15% -0.08%  0.00% 0.17% 
   [0.2] [0.8]  [-0.7] [-0.1]  [0.7] [-0.4]  [-0.0] [0.8] 
Year 5 Quarterend  0.29% 0.21%  0.49% 0.21%  0.59% 0.01%  0.62% -0.08% 
   [1.1] [1.1]  [2.1] [1.1]  [2.7] [0.1]  [2.9] [-0.4] 
 Non-quarterend 0.05% -0.07%  -0.54% -0.08%  -0.23% -0.16%  0.02% -0.43% 
  
 [0.2] [-0.4] 
 [-2.3] [-0.4]  [-1.1] [-0.9]  [0.1] [-2.2] 
 
 
When intercepting the results, one must keep in mind that as, for example, earnings 
announcements are carried out four times a year, the sample sizes of event and non-event 
portfolios of a given strategy are not equal: in average the event portfolio has a sample size one 
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half of that of non-event portfolio. This leads to event strategies being less diversified ergo 
having larger expected standard errors leading to smaller t-values. This fact may be further 
driven by my choice of portfolio valuation technique, as value weighting emphasizes the returns 
of huge companies. However, I deemed necessary that these robustness checks should be 
carried out by the same methodology as the body of my results to sustain their credibility. In 
All events portfolio the sample sizes of event and nonevent portfolios are closely comparable. 
The results obtained by these robustness checks should not be compared to my prime results in 
Table 1 per se, as both the sample time period and number of companies qualified is limited in 
the first-mentioned. 
 
Quarterend strategies continue to outperform other strategies in all portfolios except for the 
Year 3 Ex-dividend day event and Year 5 All events nonevent comparison. This is an 
encouraging sign and can be interpret as the most important finding of these robustness checks. 
None of the events investigated, nor a combination of them, seem to invalidate the fact that 
portfolios based on quarterend lags earn a premium over other strategies, although here it must 
be kept in mind that these quarterend portfolios include the powerful annual lag already 
researched by my predecessors. On average, the spreads between quarterend and non-
quarterend strategies of event and nonevent portfolios are smaller than in my prime results. 
Also, in the case of All events strategies, this spread is on average higher in event portfolios 
than in nonevent portfolios (72 bps v. 45 bps). The t-statistics of the event and nonevent 
quarterend strategies are smaller than their Table 1 counterparts, as can be expected by the 
shorter sample time frame. 
 
When analysing event v. nonevent spreads of the Year 1, the returns of event strategies are 
generally smaller than their non-event counterparts. This is particularly true in the case of non-
quarterend portfolios. In quarterend strategies, however, the differences are small, within 5 
basis points. All event and nonevent quarterend strategies remain their significance in the most 
recent portfolio formation interval. Analysing the individual events, the median effect of 
earnings announcements and dividend announcements is close to zero in all strategies. 
However, excluding the most recent past year, companies seem to yield better returns in months 
that undergo ex-dividend dates. In All events portfolios, the differences again are small: studied 
firm events seem to have little effect to the returns of my strategies.  
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Despite of the fact that quarterend strategies preserved their edge, the results of event portfolios 
are surprising compared to previous research. For example, Heston and Sadka (2008) noted the 
earnings announcement event portfolio based of all months of the first lagged year to have 
significantly higher returns than the non-event portfolio, while on my returns the non-event 
portfolio yields slightly better profits. Heston and Sadka’s results are backed by for example 
the findings by Jegadeesh and Titman (1993); the profits of momentum portfolios are 
concentrated around earnings announcements. The most prominent explanation to this finding 
is my choice of weighting methodology, my different time sample and my decision to leave 
stocks priced under $5 from my analysis. These issues are discussed further in this thesis.  
 
 
5.5.Traditional momentum 
 
The results of Tables 1 and 3 motivate me to further investigate the traditional from 2 to 12 
months momentum effect. I am interested of how much of the momentum profits can be 
explained by the profits of quarter end months i.e. 3rd, 6th, 9th and 12th lag. Heston and Sadka 
(2008) noticed that portfolio constructed based on just the 12th lag had higher t-value that that 
of full-one-year portfolio. However, they included the first monthly lag in their full-one-year 
portfolio, that unquestionably weakened its profits because of the strong short-term reversal 
phenomena. I will exclude the first lagged month from the analysis and include a portfolio based 
on non-quarterend months of the traditional momentum, i.e. monthly lags of 2,4,5,7,8,10 and 
11. The average returns and t-statistics are presented in Table 5. Results from both value 
weighted and equal weighted portfolios are shown for further evidence. The table also includes 
quarterend strategy and nonannual quarterend strategy already reported in the former parts of 
this thesis. This is because I consider this table to have the most significant findings of my work 
and I prefer easy comparability of the results. Portfolios based on just the first annual lag are 
also present to distinct its effect.  
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Table 5 - Portfolios based on intermediate-term past returns 
In a given month t, U.S. stocks reported in CRSP database are grouped into ten portfolios based on their past performance, top decile belonging to winner (W) and low decile 
to loser (L) portfolios. The strategies are named based on the lagged returns on which their returns are based, 2:12 being the “traditional momentum” strategy of the past one 
year excluding the month recent past month. Winners-minus-losers portfolio (W-L) is created every month by subtracting the returns of losers from winners. Portfolios are 
updated monthly and average returns (in percent) and t-statics (in brackets) of all strategies are calculated from January 1946 to December 2016 (852 months). Results of both 
value and equal weighted portfolios are presented. 
 
Strategy   W 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 L  W-L 
               
 2:12  1.35% 1.05% 0.87% 0.78% 0.66% 0.59% 0.53% 0.49% 0.39% 0.26%  1.10% 
   [6.1] [6.1] [5.5] [5.2] [4.5] [4.2] [3.7] [3.1] [2.2] [1.2]  [5.1] 
 3,6,9,12  1.39% 1.12% 0.96% 0.70% 0.76% 0.66% 0.51% 0.42% 0.34% 0.14%  1.25% 
   [6.6] [6.5] [6.3] [4.8] [5.3] [4.8] [3.5] [2.8] [2.0] [0.7]  [7.3] 
Value weighted 2,4,5,7,8,10,11  1.13% 0.88% 0.70% 0.66% 0.62% 0.64% 0.62% 0.62% 0.64% 0.59%  0.54% 
   [5.2] [5.1] [4.6] [4.5] [4.3] [4.5] [4.2] [4.0] [3.7] [2.8]  [2.9] 
 3,6,9  1.32% 1.05% 0.85% 0.74% 0.72% 0.63% 0.64% 0.49% 0.39% 0.30%  1.02% 
   [6.3] [6.1] [5.4] [5.2] [5.1] [4.4] [4.5] [3.2] [2.2] [1.5]  [5.9] 
 12  1.17% 0.96% 0.89% 0.78% 0.72% 0.65% 0.53% 0.49% 0.49% 0.40%  0.77% 
   [5.6] [5.5] [5.7] [5.2] [5.0] [4.6] [3.7] [3.3] [3.0] [2.2]  [5.1] 
               
 2:12  1.55% 1.31% 1.15% 1.03% 0.97% 0.88% 0.78% 0.74% 0.70% 0.76%  0.79% 
   [6.9] [7.3] [7.1] [6.7] [6.5] [5.9] [5.1] [4.6] [3.9] [3.4]  [4.6] 
 3,6,9,12  1.58% 1.34% 1.22% 1.09% 0.99% 0.93% 0.89% 0.80% 0.74% 0.70%  0.88% 
   [7.4] [7.5] [7.5] [7.1] [6.5] [6.2] [5.8] [5.0] [4.2] [3.3]  [7.0] 
Equal weighted 2,4,5,7,8,10,11  1.34% 1.11% 1.02% 0.97% 0.92% 0.92% 0.91% 0.94% 0.89% 0.98%  0.36% 
   [6.1] [6.2] [6.3] [6.2] [6.1] [6.0] [5.9] [5.8] [5.1] [4.6]  [2.4] 
 3,6,9  1.58% 1.26% 1.16% 1.08% 1.02% 0.96% 0.92% 0.83% 0.85% 0.82%  0.76% 
   [7.5] [7.2] [7.1] [7.0] [6.8] [6.4] [5.9] [5.1] [4.7] [3.8]  [5.7] 
 12  1.66% 1.36% 1.27% 1.16% 1.12% 1.07% 1.01% 1.02% 0.98% 1.12%  0.54% 
   [7.5] [7.4] [7.5] [7.3] [7.2] [7.0] [6.5] [6.3] [5.6] [5.4]  [5.1] 
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The results seem favourable to Hypothesis 2. The portfolio based on the most recent four 
quarterend lags gives higher average returns and a larger t-value, indicating a higher Sharpe-
ratio (Sharpe (1994), than a traditional momentum portfolio in both value weighted and equal 
weighted results. It seems that profits of the momentum phenomena can be more efficiently 
captured by investing in stocks that have performed well in past four lagged quarters and selling 
those that have performed poorly. However, it should be emphasized that to ensure 
comparability between my strategies, the 2:12 momentum portfolio here is built based on 
average returns of given months and not according to cumulative returns, like is more 
traditional. The effect of this choice, justified in the Methodology section, is analysed further 
in this Thesis.  
 
Short term reversal indeed seems to have a strong effect on the explanatory power of past one 
year returns to stock performance. W-L portfolio based on full past one-year returns has a t-
value of 3.6 while a portfolio excluding the most recent past month has 5.0, while the difference 
in average returns is 32 basis points monthly. The magnitude is not unheard of in the literature, 
but proves the need of separating full-one-year returns from the traditional momentum portfolio 
in this analysis. Albeit large, the effect of short term reversal alone does not explain the 
difference between past-one-year and quarterend portfolios as the latter continues to outperform 
even if the most recent past month is left out. 
 
It is notable, that the portfolio formed based on three latest quarterly lags also performs 
considerably better that one formed with non-quarterend months. The quarterly seasonality 
indeed seems to be a significant force also separately from annual seasonality researched by 
Heston and Sadka (2008) and Keloharju et al. (2016) also in traditional momentum. The three-
quarterend portfolio also holds larger t-value, implying a larger Sharpe-ratio, than the 2:12 
portfolio! This holds in both value and equal weighted portfolios. I consider this to be one of 
the most interesting findings of my thesis.  
 
As previously noted by Heston and Sadka, the twelfth lag alone appears to be responsible for a 
huge part of the returns full one-year lag. Like in their results, the t-value of the lagged 12th 
month portfolio surpasses that of the full one-year strategy (5.1 against 3.6 in value weighted 
portfolios) in Table 1. Even after removing the effect of short-term reversal, the first annual lag 
alone yields equal t-value in value weighted and larger in equal weighted portfolios. Twelfth 
lag alone, however, is surpassed by the four- and three-quarterend portfolios of the first year.  
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As I consider these results concerning the traditional momentum important for my Thesis and 
also interesting for potential future research, I decided to form event test similar to those of 
quarterend strategies presented earlier in this thesis. Table 6 holds returns and t-statistics of 
even and non-event portfolios constructed identically to those of Table 4. Only the results from 
value weighted portfolios are presented. 
 
Table 6 - Portfolios controlling firm-specific events for strategies based on intermediate-term 
past returns 
In a given month t, U.S. stocks that have returns reported in CRSP database and event-specific information 
available in CRSP/Compustat are grouped into ten portfolios based on their past performance, top decile belonging 
to winner (W) and low decile to loser (L) portfolios. The strategies are named based on the lagged returns on which 
their returns are based, 2:12 being the “traditional momentum” strategy of the past one year excluding the month 
recent past month. Event (nonevent) portfolios consists of companies that undergo (do not undergo) the said event 
on month t. Only the returns of winners-minus-losers portfolios are presented. They are created every month by 
subtracting the returns of losers from winners. Portfolios are updated monthly and average value weighted returns 
(in percent) and t-statics (in brackets) of event and nonevent portfolios are calculated from October 1976 to 
December 2016 (483 months). 
 
  
Earnings 
announcement 
 
Dividend 
announcement 
 
Ex dividend day 
 
All events      
             
Strategy  event nonevent  event nonevent  event nonevent  event nonevent 
             
2:12  0.92% 0.83%  0.92% 0.87%  0.62% 1.01%  0.44% 0.96% 
  [2.4] [2.6]  [3.0] [2.6]  [1.9] [3.1]  [1.1] [2.4] 
3,6,9,12  1.05% 1.06%  1.11% 1.16%  1.03% 1.08%  1.04% 1.00% 
  [3.2] [3.9]  [4.4] [4.1]  [3.8] [4.0]  [3.8] [3.4] 
2,4,5,7,8,10,11  0.24% 0.54%  0.33% 0.36%  0.14% 0.50%  0.05% 0.59% 
  [0.7] [1.9]  [1.2] [1.2]  [0.5] [1.7]  [0.1] [1.7] 
3,6,9  1.00% 0.97%  0.88% 1.00%  0.94% 0.93%  0.66% 1.08% 
  [3.0] [3.6]  [3.5] [3.6]  [3.4] [3.4]  [2.0] [3.1] 
12  0.42% 0.53%  0.34% 0.52%  0.36% 0.42%  0.25% 0.25% 
  [1.4] [2.2]  [1.5] [2.2]  [1.4] [1.9]  [0.9] [0.9] 
 
 
Again, when interpreting the results, one should keep in mind that in general the event portfolios 
have fewer companies than their nonevent peers, leading to higher expected standard errors and 
thus to smaller t-values, with the exception of All events strategies where the number of event 
undergoing and non-undergoing companies is closely comparable.  
 
The results of Table 6 are quite well in line with those of Tables 4 and 5. Apart from the 
nonevent portfolio of the All events strategy, quarterend portfolio outperforms its peers. 
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Interestingly, both the event and nonevent portfolios based on entirely to the first annual lag 
perform considerably worse compared to their Table 5 counterpart. This seems also to have 
further effect, as a strategy based on the returns of first three quarters has returns comparable 
to those of full quarterend portfolio. This remarkable finding craves for further research beyond 
this thesis. Not surprisingly, all 2:12 and 2,4,5,7,8,10,11 portfolios beat their Table 4 All and 
Non-quartered counterparts, which is yet another example of the power of the short-term return 
reversal.  
 
 
5.6.Returns through the calendar year 
 
To further analyse the performance of my value weighted quarterend strategies, I have dividend 
the 71-year return history of my portfolios based on individual calendar months. Similar 
analysis was done by Heston and Sadka (2008). Average returns and t-statistics are presented 
in Table 7. For example, the column Jan of the Year 1 shows the average January performance 
of the W-L portfolio based on most recent four quarters.  
 
Compared to the W-L portfolios on the Table 1, the average monthly returns presented here 
often lack significance. This, however, is the results of a sample size one twelfth of the original, 
leading to smaller t-values categorically. As can be expected by the previous literature on the 
effect of past returns (e.g. Jegadeesh and Titman (1993), the Year 1 quarterend portfolio has 
(insignificant) negative average returns in January. All other months of the strategy are positive, 
most of them significantly. The strategy earns its highest returns in June and December that are, 
conveniently, also end-months of seasonal quarters. This is likely a coincidence as December 
is traditionally good month for momentum and neither March nor September show abnormally 
high returns.  
 
All in all, the effect of January seems small in my results. Excluding the first individual year 
portfolios, the January returns are very close to the average performance of the strategy, even 
exceeding that in the Years 16-20 portfolio. This is probably caused by my exclusion of stocks 
priced less than $5 USD and the chosen weighting methodology, as Conrad and Kaul (1993) 
noticed small stocks to affect heavy into long-term return reversal. Little common denominators 
seem to emerge when observing the table. This proves that the quarterly seasonality is not tied 
to any particular calendar period but abnormal returns seem to be achievable almost around the 
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year. This finding is viable, as it makes investment to quarterend strategies considerably more 
practical.  
 
Table 7 - Returns of quarterend portfolios in individual calendar months 
In a given month t, U.S. stocks reported in CRSP database are grouped into ten portfolios based on their past 
performance, top decile belonging to winners (W) and low decile to loser (L) portfolios. For example, the Year 1 
strategy is based on returns of months t-3, t-6, t-9 and t-12. Only the returns of winners-minus-losers portfolios are 
presented. They are created every month by subtracting the returns of losers from winners. Portfolios are updated 
monthly; stocks are value weighted and average returns (in percent) and t-statics (in brackets) are shown 
individually for all calendar months. Returns calculation period extends from January 1946 to December 2016 
(852 months). 
 
Strategy Jan Feb Mar Apr May Jun Jul Aug Sep Oct Nov Dec 
             
Year 1 -0.20% 1.95% 1.14% 1.01% 1.18% 2.07% 0.22% 1.17% 1.12% 1.18% 1.76% 2.42% 
 [-0.3] [2.6] [2.4] [1.7] [2.3] [4.6] [0.4] [2.4] [1.9] [2.2] [2.5] [4.0] 
             
Year 2 -0.18% 0.26% 0.63% -0.22% 0.62% 0.82% 0.48% -0.01% 0.54% 0.61% 1.05% -0.02% 
 [-0.3] [0.4] [1.5] [-0.5] [1.7] [2.0] [1.3] [0.0] [1.2] [1.2] [1.7] [-0.1] 
             
Year 3 -0.08% 0.10% 0.09% 0.19% 0.84% 0.17% 0.32% 0.52% 0.28% -0.19% 1.68% 0.41% 
 [-0.2] [0.2] [0.3] [0.5] [2.1] [0.5] [0.7] [1.4] [0.5] [-0.4] [3.7] [1.2] 
             
Year 4 0.44% 0.95% 0.38% -0.44% 0.53% 0.19% -0.52% 1.17% 0.99% 0.03% 0.97% 0.60% 
 [1.0] [1.7] [1.0] [-1.3] [1.4] [0.6] [-1.6] [3.5] [2.0] [0.1] [1.9] [1.3] 
             
Year 5 0.32% 0.60% 0.13% 0.23% -0.27% 1.23% 0.75% -0.40% 0.15% 0.47% 0.23% 0.31% 
 [0.7] [1.3] [0.4] [0.7] [-0.7] [3.1] [2.2] [-1.1] [0.3] [1.1] [0.4] [0.8] 
             
Years 6-10 0.73% 0.85% 0.23% 0.57% 0.54% 0.83% 1.39% 0.68% 0.24% 0.80% 1.20% 0.70% 
 [1.6] [1.4] [0.6] [1.5] [1.4] [2.3] [3.0] [1.8] [0.6] [1.8] [2.1] [2.0] 
             
Years 11-15 0.34% 0.75% 0.31% -0.41% 0.57% 0.50% 0.67% 0.46% 0.29% 0.19% 1.60% 0.08% 
 [0.9] [2.1] [0.9] [-1.2] [1.4] [1.4] [2.1] [1.2] [1.0] [0.5] [3.8] [0.2] 
             
Years 16-20 0.85% 0.25% -0.12% -1.03% 0.58% 0.17% 0.15% 0.74% -0.09% 0.63% 1.19% 0.18% 
 [1.7] [0.5] [-0.4] [-3.0] [1.6] [0.5] [0.4] [2.2] [-0.2] [1.5] [2.8] [0.4] 
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6. Discussion 
 
 
Although my results are reviewed in their respective sections, here I will further discuss my 
findings and the phenomena of quarterly seasonality. I will firstly analyse whether the 
hypotheses stated earlier in this Thesis can be proven correct by my analysis, address some 
limitations of my study and compare my findings to previous in the field of the effect of past 
returns. I will then dedicate a subchapter on possible reasons for the phenomena, concentrating 
on firm-specific events and finally briefly tackle the potential practical barriers of exploiting 
the quarterly seasonality phenomena. 
 
 
6.1.Confirming hypotheses and additional robustness checks 
 
The results confirm Hypothesis 1. Investing in stocks based on their lagged quarterend returns 
is more profitable than based on their past performance in general. This holds in all eight 
formation intervals up to 20 years, as can be seen in Table 1. The spread in average returns 
between zero-investment strategies based on quarterend lagged months and all lagged months 
of the most recent past year is 47 basis points monthly. This spread is considerably large 
compared to monthly profits of all-lags strategy, 78 basis points monthly. Quarterend strategies 
also have larger t-value than their peers. The effect of quarterly seasonality cannot be solely 
explained by the annual seasonality studied by my predecessors, as can be seen in Table 2. The 
nonannual quarterend strategies continue to outperform strategies based on all lagged months 
in every portfolio formation interval. The quarterly seasonality effect is weaker in equally 
weighted portfolios (Table 3) but still yield significantly positive returns in strategy based on 
most recent four quarterend lags. 
 
Hypothesis 2 states that investing in stocks based on their returns of the most recent four 
quarters is more profitable than following a traditional momentum strategy taking into account 
past returns from 2 to 12-month period. Indeed, the average returns of a quarterend strategy 
based on the most recent past year exceeds those of traditional momentum portfolio by 15 basis 
points monthly (1.8% yearly) and also has a higher t-value. Notably, the strategy investing 
based on the returns of most recent three quarters has a t-value higher that the of the traditional 
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momentum portfolio, implying larger Sharpe-ratio (Sharpe (1994). The results hold in both 
value weighted and equal weighted portfolios.  
 
We can also confirm Hypothesis 3 based on my results. The quarterend months do not seem to 
contribute to long-term return reversal phenomenon. Strategies based on quarterend months 
remain significantly positive on the formation intervals of past two to five years. The average 
returns remain positive, although insignificant after the most recent lagged year when the annual 
lags are removed from the analysis. When addressing this finding, it should be remembered that 
I have excluded stocks priced smaller than $5 USD from my data. These stocks were found by 
Conrad and Kaul (1993) to have an effect to long-term reversal phenomena, but their exclusion 
was a decision influenced by many of my predecessors studying the effect of past returns (e.g. 
Jegadeesh and Titman (2001). However, my chosen valuation methodology of value weighting 
should reduce the effect of these “penny stocks” and thus increase the robustness of my results 
related to Hypothesis 3.  
 
I decided to use dividend excluded returns in my analysis as I initially feared dividends to create 
autocorrelation in my data when studying the effect of past quarterly returns. In retrospect, this 
fear was most likely without ground. As a robustness check, I formed a quarterend strategy 
based on the most recent past year also with dividend-included returns and delisting returns 
data (full results unreported). The average returns ceteris paribus of the winners-minus-losers 
portfolio including dividends is 1.03% monthly (t-value 6.1) which is less than for a strategy 
excluding dividend from Table 1 yielding 1.25% monthly (t-value 7.3). The return difference 
is caused by higher performance of all decile portfolios with divided-included data, leading into 
smaller returns of winners-minus-losers portfolio. I have little reason to doubt that with 
divideds-included data, my results of winners-minus-losers portfolios would be smaller across 
all strategies but do not see that this would endanger my results altogether. 
 
My portfolios are formed based on average returns of given months, as majority of my strategies 
are based on non-continuous lags. Because of comparability, average weighting was also used 
in portfolios based on continuous months, including the traditional momentum. As momentum 
portfolios are often based on cumulative returns, it could be questioned whether the portfolio 
based on quarterend months outperforms the traditional momentum based on cumulative 
returns. My Year 1 quarterend portfolio has average returns of 1.25% (t-value 7.3) while the 
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portfolio based on past months 2:12 has 1.10% (t-value 5.1) during a period from 1946 to 2016. 
During a similar period, momentum portfolio based on cumulative returns published in the data 
library of Kenneth French earns on average 0.71% (t-value 5.4) monthly. Although this 
portfolio is not compeletely comparable to my results as it uses breaking points of 3rd decile 
and 7th decile to define winners and losers and is actually based on the returns of several 
momentum portfolios of different size groups, it can be safely stated that the returns of Year 1 
quarterend strategy are more than competitive when compared to traditional momentum 
strategies.  
 
My equally weighted returns are considerably less significant than value weighted ones. 
Speculatively, this might be the reason why Heston and Sadka, whose prime returns were 
equally weighted, did not comment on the quarterly pattern in their results. The smaller returns 
of equally weighted zero-investment portfolios are resulted by the better performance of equal 
weighted decile portfolios overall: Every single equally weighted decile portfolio presented in 
this work has higher average monthly return than its value weighted counterpart. This finding 
makes sense as small stocks have been found to have larger average returns (e.g. Banz (1981). 
The standard errors are also smaller in equally weighted portfolios which is reasonable as 
companies of extremely large size can have substantial effect to value weighted strategies. It is 
unclear, however, whether this effect alone explains the weaker returns of winners-minus-losers 
portfolios of equally weighted strategies. Table I of Appendix can be used to further investigate 
the difference. Table I includes only companies that have a market capitalization larger than 
NYSE median. All average returns of quarterend W-L strategies of the large-company sample 
in Table I are significantly positive and within 15 basis points from their whole-sample 
counterparts from Table 1 and the median spread is positive. This observation suggests that the 
small stock may indeed be behind the lower average returns. The finding is interesting and 
craves for further research beyond this thesis.  
 
Straightforward comparison between my results and ones of Heston and Sadka (2008) is 
difficult because of differences in data and methodology. Heston and Sadka used data from 
1945 to 2002 consisting 58 years, whereas I used the full existence of CRSP database from 
1926 to 2016, or 91 years, in my results excluding the event studies. My predecessors also used 
portfolio formation intervals distributed more evenly in the examination period extending to 
lagged 20 years, whereas I concentrated on the intermediate horizon. Another key difference is 
that Heston and Sadka used equal weighted returns as a base of their analysis when I used 
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mainly value weighting although I also included equal weighted portfolios for comparison. My 
predecessors did not mention removing stocks priced less than $5 USD, so they were 
presumably kept in the analysis while I excluded them. Comparing my returns of All portfolios 
from Table 1 to Heston and Sadka’s results is the best available comparison between these two 
works. Our results from winners-minus-losers portfolios are well in line when taking into 
account the differences in data and methodology. If anything, Heston and Sadka’s results are 
larger in magnitude: Both the average returns of Year 1 portfolio are higher and the returns on 
longer formation intervals lower than mine. They are also considerable differences in the results 
of event control tests, which will be addressed further in this chapter.  
 
Novy-Marx claims in his 2012 study that the returns of past seven to twelve months are mainly 
responsible for the momentum returns. The findings of my study do not fully support his results. 
Although the twelfth lag undoubtedly holds a huge effect to momentum and there is significant 
short-term reversal phenomenon, I find no other evidence of clear differences in 
autocorrelations between the short and long horizon months of the traditional momentum. De 
Bondt and Thaler (1985) found the return reversal effect to affect more significantly to past 
losers than to winners. When analysing my results of the decile portfolios of nonannual 
quarterend strategies, similar effect can be found. Loser portfolios of the portfolio formation 
intervals of Year 2 to Year 5 are higher or equal than the average returns of decile portfolios of 
the interval in question. This effect is considerably weaker in full quarterend portfolios, but the 
returns of loser portfolios are still close to median returns of the decile portfolios in intervals 
accosiated with the long-term return reversal phenomena. 
 
 
6.2.Causes of quarterly seasonality 
 
I tested the effect of several company specific events to identify possible causes of the quarterly 
seasonality pattern I had found. The effect of earnings announcements, dividend 
announcements and ex-dividend dates were all tested individually in the spirit of Heston and 
Sadka (2008). In addition, I also tested the pooled effect of these events with a combined 
dataset. None of the individual events nor their combination seems to explain the quarterly 
seasonality phenomena but the strategies continue to outperform others in both event and 
nonevent portfolios in almost all the cases. This was a surprise for me, as I thought that events, 
51 
and especially quarterly earnings announcements, would have played an important role in 
explaining the remarkable quarterend pattern. 
 
The results of these event portfolios of earnings announcements were also particularly 
bewildering, and even seemed implausible at first glance when comparing to results obtained 
by previous literature. For example, the spread between earnings announcement event and 
nonevent portfolios’ average returns of the Year 1 All strategy differs from what Heston and 
Sadka (2008) reported. I see three potential reasons for this difference besides mistake of either 
me or my predecessors: My chose to exclude stocks priced lower than $5 USD, our differences 
in portfolio weighting methodology and the difference in time periods of returns calculation. 
Heston and Sadka calculate portfolio returns from January 1965 to December 2002 while I 
calculate the returns of event portfolios from October 1976 to December 2016. This leaves 315 
historical months where our time periods intersect, compared to my total of 483 months of 
returns calculation. 
 
The differences in portfolio weighting methodology and time period of return calculation are 
my prime suspects. To test their effect, I calculated the average returns of equally weighted 
event portfolios (unreported) from October 1976 to December 2002. Unfortunately, I could not 
extend my portfolio formation period all the way to Heston and Sadka’s starting point, 1965 
because of data limitations of Compustat. Here I am particularly interested in the results of 
strategies based on all lagged months, as those portfolios are comparable to Heston and Sadka’s 
results. The average returns of earnings announcement event portfolio based on all months of 
the most recent past year was 0.93% (t-value 2.4) and nonevent 0.47% (t-value 1.3). The values 
differ remarkably from my prime results gained using value weighting methodology and a time 
period exceeding to December 2016. Further analysis unveils that this difference seems to 
originate from both the weighting method and the time period, as value weighted returns of 
event portfolio are already larger than that of their nonevent peer’s when the time frame is 
limited to December 2002, but the difference is smaller than in the case of equal weighted 
results. 
 
It is thus proven that the weighting methodology and different time frame is, at least partly, 
behind the differences between mine and Heston and Sadka’s event portfolio results. My 
average equal weighted returns from October 1976 to December 2016 are smaller in magnitude 
than the returns got by Heston and Sadka, 2.19% (6.15) for event months and 1.22% (4.20) for 
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nonevent months, but more comparable than my prime results. It comes as to no surprise that 
equal weighted earnings announcement event portfolios perform better than their value 
weighted peers as the post earnings announcement drift affects most heavily on small stocks 
(e.g. Chari, Jagannathan and Ofer (1988). However, it is interesting how the difference between 
event and nonevent earnings announcement portfolios seemed to dilute after 2002. Indeed, the 
average returns of the 14-year period of 2003-2016 for event and nonevent earnings 
announcement Year 1 All portfolios were -0.34% and 0.30%, respectively. Companies that did 
not undergo earnings announcement in a given month outperformed those that did on a clear 
margin, on the contrary what one would expect based on previous literature. This interesting 
finding claims for further investigation out of the scope of this work. 
 
Besides firm-specific events of the fiscal year, little credible explanations for the quarterly 
seasonality phenomenon comes to mind. The pattern is strong and robust and although it seems 
to have low returns in January, like many of the strategies based on past returns do, it is quite 
persistent across the calendar year. Institutional trading might partly explain quarterly 
seasonality as it has proven to have a price impact (e.g. Sias, Starks and Titman (2001) and 
behaviours like window dressing might contribute to quarterly trading patterns. It is hard to 
believe, however, that these patterns alone would be behind the quarterly seasonality. 
Controlling for stock institutional ownership could produce interesting results but is 
unfortunately outside the scope of my work. It would be also interesting to further investigate 
the effect of company market capitalization to quarterly seasonality, as my equal weighted 
returns in Table 3 are considerably weaker than value weighted in Table 1. Further analysis on 
the matter could help to explain the quarterly pattern. 
 
 
6.3.Practical implementation of the strategy 
 
Although the prime perspective of this Thesis is not to present a practical, profit-earning 
strategy, I think it is important, even if shortly, to address the potent limitations of exploitation 
of the quarterend pattern that I have discovered. I have discovered a powerful pattern in U.S. 
stock markets: winners-minus-losers i.e. zero investment portfolios based on quarterend months 
yield significantly positive profits. However, in practice certain barriers and market 
inefficiencies can obstruct the exploitation of my results, most important of them being trading 
costs, price impact of trade, illiquidity and potential difficulties of short sale. 
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All strategies presented in this Thesis have a portfolio holding period of one month. Like all 
strategies based on past returns, quarterend strategies demand considerable upkeeping leading 
into trading fees. As the strategies are based on past returns of non-continuous months, they 
presumably demand even more trading activity compared to, for example, traditional 
momentum strategies. However, the profits of the strategies are considerable: winners-minus-
losers portfolio based on the returns of the last four quarterend months yield on average 1.25% 
monthly (16.10% yearly) and thus should remain profitable after taking into account modest 
trading expenses. 
 
Sufficient liquidity and the price impact of trade is another concern in all stock dealing 
strategies. This obstacle has only limited affect to my portfolios as they have been shown to 
excel when value weighted. Weighting stocks accepted to portfolio based on their market 
capitalization emphasizes large companies that are more likely to have liquid, much traded 
securities. Large market cap also decreases the price impact. For example Korajczyk and Sadka 
(2004) noted that value weighted strategies tend to perform better after taking into account 
transaction costs and the price impact of trade. Restricting stocks priced under $5 USD, like I 
have done in all strategies of this work, will further increase the liquidity of the strategy. 
 
Although one could only invest to winner portfolio of quarterend strategy (and profit quite 
handsomely), strategies of most concern presented in this Thesis are zero-investment in nature. 
This implies, that an investor must commit to shares borrowing i.e. short stocks to follow them. 
Short selling is both legal and extremely popular in U.S.; Diether, Lee and Werner (2008) find 
short sales to constitute 24% of share volume in NYSE. In despite of this, share loan fees vary 
tremendously. Diether (2008) investigated U.S. short selling contracts from 1999 to 2005 and 
reported that while the median fee was 2.45% p.a., 25th and 75th percentiles were 0.16% and 
5.19% p.a., respectively. However, short selling fee was found to be strongly inversely related 
to market cap, large-cap stocks having low fees. Again my choice of portfolio valuation method 
and “penny stock” restrictions will limit the encumbrance of these fees in my strategies. 
 
Not only being both technically and practically viable, quarterend strategies are also simple: 
ranking stocks based on their average returns of past quarterend months does not demand 
complex modelling or investment analysis and neither does building value weighted portfolios 
based on this ranking. The practical implementation of, for example, the Year 1 quarterend 
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strategy is also supported by the fact that the profits are distributed quite evenly around the 
year, January being the only month with negative average profits as can be observed from the 
Table 7. This further simplifies the investment procedure and one can justifiable argue that, 
beyond the cost of transactions and short sale, quarterend strategies can be executed quite 
affordably.  
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7. Conclusion 
 
 
In this Master’s Thesis I have research the previously undiscovered stock market phenomenon 
of quarterly seasonality, related to the explanatory power of past returns to stock price. I found 
that security’s expected performance in a given month t is correlated with its returns in lagged 
quarterend months i.e. months t-3,6,9,…. I formed monthly updated stock trading strategies 
based on returns of quarterend lagged months and compared them to strategies based on returns 
of all lags and non-quarterend lags. The quarterend strategies beat other strategies in all tested 
formation intervals.  
 
The differences in portfolio returns were notable. A value weighted zero-investment strategy 
based on the returns of quarterend lags of the most recent past year yields on average 1.25% 
monthly (16.10% yearly) during the investment period of 852 months from 1946 to 2016, while 
a strategy based on non-quarterend lags has an average returns of 0.25% during the same period. 
This pattern is not limited to the most recent past year, but the returns of zero-investment 
quarterend strategies remain significantly positive in every tested portfolio formation interval 
up to lagged 20 years. 
 
The returns of these portfolios cannot be full explained by the strong correlation of annual 
lagged returns (months t-12,24,36,…) to stock price. Strategies based on nonannual quarterend 
lags still outperformed strategies based on all months in every interval. The returns of 
nonannual quarterend strategies based on the returns of lagged years 2-5 had positive, although 
insignificant, returns implying that past quarterend months do not contribute to long-term 
reversal phenomenon. The equally weighted returns of quarterend winners-minus-losers 
portfolios were considerably smaller than their value weighted peers, originating from the better 
relative performance of losers portfolios.  
 
Quarterend strategy based on the most recent past year was found to be more lucrative yet less 
risky than the traditional momentum strategy based on returns of months t-2:12. This finding 
is remarkable. In pure asset management sense, it seems to be more profitable to invest on 
quarterend strategy rather than on a strategy based on the average returns of past year, even 
after the negatively correlated most recent month has been left out from the analysis. The 
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finding may also help us to better understand the underlying forces behind one of the most 
puzzling anomalies of the asset management literature. Interestingly, a nonannual quarterend 
strategy also had higher t-value than the traditional momentum strategy, implying again that 
this quarterend patterns cannot be fully explained by the annual seasonality phenomenon. The 
performance of quarterend strategies could not be explained by firm-specific events of the fiscal 
year. Controlling for earnings announcements, dividend announcements or ex-dividend dates 
did not diminish the superiority of quarterend portfolios neither when tested individually nor 
with an event-combined dataset. Returns of quarterend strategies were also not tied to any 
particular calendar month, although the returns of a strategy based on most recent four quarters 
performed poorly on January and particularly well in December.  
 
I was unable to find the origins of the quarterly seasonality phenomena in my research. This 
should be, in my opinion, the fundamental goal for any further research on the subject. 
Robustness checks on the returns could be widened to include industries and the effect of 
market capitalization could be research further perhaps by dividing companies into different 
size groups. Controlling for institutional trading would help to identify the possible effect of 
window dressing to the phenomena. The decision for excluding stocks priced less than $5 USD 
could be questioned and its effect tested. Event controlling tests could be widened still. It would 
also be interesting to examine whether my results hold in markets outside U.S. 
 
I am more than satisfied with the outcome of my Master’s Thesis. The journey of making this 
work has been the most arduous of my life, but at the same time both tremendously educational 
and rewarding. After standing on the shoulders of so many giants, my hope is that this Thesis 
could provide something to its reader, were it data or an inspiration for future research.  
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9. Appendix 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table I – Large cap portfolios based on past returns 
In a given month t, U.S. stocks reported in CRSP database that have a market capitalization larger than NYSE median are grouped into ten portfolios based on their past 
performance, top decile belonging to winner (W) and low decile to loser (L) portfolios. For example, the Quarterend strategy of Year 1 is based on returns of months t-3, t-6, t-
9 and t-12 while the All strategy of the same interval is based on months from t-1 to t-12. Winners-minus-losers portfolio (W-L) is created every month by subtracting the 
returns of losers from winners. Portfolios are updated monthly and average value weighted returns (in percent) and t-statics (in brackets) of all strategies are calculated from 
January 1946 to December 2016 (852 months). 
 
Strategy   W 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 L  W-L 
               
 All  1.10% 0.89% 0.76% 0.69% 0.51% 0.57% 0.44% 0.48% 0.45% 0.50%  0.60% 
   [5.1] [4.9] [4.5] [4.2] [3.2] [3.4] [2.7] [2.8] [2.4] [2.2]  [2.9] 
Year 1 Quarterend  1.19% 0.98% 0.86% 0.69% 0.63% 0.57% 0.48% 0.44% 0.36% 0.08%  1.11% 
   [5.6] [5.4] [5.0] [4.3] [4.0] [3.5] [3.0] [2.6] [1.9] [0.4]  [6.6] 
 Non-quarterend  0.83% 0.72% 0.61% 0.59% 0.56% 0.56% 0.60% 0.57% 0.63% 0.74%  0.09% 
   [3.9] [4.1] [3.5] [3.6] [3.4] [3.6] [3.7] [3.4] [3.4] [3.4]  [0.5] 
               
 All  0.63% 0.61% 0.48% 0.53% 0.67% 0.48% 0.65% 0.68% 0.86% 0.86%  -0.23% 
   [2.9] [3.3] [2.8] [3.2] [4.0] [2.9] [3.7] [4.1] [4.7] [4.3]  [-1.3] 
Year 2 Quarterend  0.89% 0.71% 0.67% 0.61% 0.64% 0.53% 0.59% 0.54% 0.53% 0.61%  0.27% 
   [4.3] [3.9] [3.8] [3.7] [3.9] [3.4] [3.7] [3.2] [3.0] [3.0]  [2.0] 
 Non-quarterend  0.42% 0.47% 0.51% 0.54% 0.47% 0.55% 0.70% 0.79% 0.83% 1.01%  -0.60% 
   [2.0] [2.6] [3.1] [3.2] [2.9] [3.3] [4.1] [4.5] [4.7] [5.3]  [-3.8] 
               
 All  0.61% 0.61% 0.60% 0.65% 0.56% 0.53% 0.57% 0.61% 0.66% 0.80%  -0.19% 
   [2.8] [3.2] [3.4] [3.8] [3.3] [3.2] [3.4] [3.6] [3.8] [4.2]  [-1.3] 
Year 3 Quarterend  0.78% 0.77% 0.67% 0.67% 0.66% 0.52% 0.50% 0.52% 0.41% 0.52%  0.26% 
   [3.7] [4.1] [3.8] [4.0] [4.0] [3.2] [3.1] [3.1] [2.4] [2.7]  [2.1] 
 Non-quarterend  0.49% 0.51% 0.57% 0.49% 0.55% 0.59% 0.63% 0.67% 0.82% 0.87%  -0.37% 
   [2.3] [2.7] [3.3] [2.9] [3.3] [3.6] [3.8] [3.9] [4.7] [4.6]  [-2.6] 
63 
Strategy   W 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 L  W-L 
               
 All  0.86% 0.76% 0.67% 0.63% 0.68% 0.63% 0.67% 0.60% 0.63% 0.75%  0.10% 
   [4.2] [4.5] [4.2] [4.2] [4.7] [4.5] [4.6] [4.1] [4.3] [4.8]  [0.7] 
Year 4 Quarterend  0.93% 0.87% 0.82% 0.68% 0.61% 0.63% 0.64% 0.65% 0.50% 0.47%  0.45% 
   [4.9] [5.2] [5.3] [4.5] [4.3] [4.4] [4.5] [4.5] [3.4] [2.9]  [3.8] 
 Non-quarterend  0.72% 0.66% 0.60% 0.59% 0.58% 0.67% 0.74% 0.71% 0.76% 0.89%  -0.17% 
   [3.7] [3.9] [3.9] [4.0] [3.9] [4.7] [5.2] [4.9] [5.2] [5.5]  [-1.3] 
               
 All  0.88% 0.64% 0.77% 0.65% 0.71% 0.53% 0.70% 0.64% 0.63% 0.67%  0.21% 
   [4.3] [3.8] [5.0] [4.3] [4.8] [3.7] [5.0] [4.6] [4.4] [4.2]  [1.7] 
Year 5 Quarterend  0.88% 0.86% 0.88% 0.81% 0.75% 0.59% 0.52% 0.54% 0.47% 0.43%  0.46% 
   [4.7] [5.4] [5.6] [5.5] [5.3] [4.2] [3.6] [3.7] [3.1] [2.6]  [3.9] 
 Non-quarterend  0.67% 0.64% 0.63% 0.59% 0.58% 0.58% 0.70% 0.75% 0.83% 0.85%  -0.18% 
   [3.4] [3.9] [4.1] [4.0] [4.0] [4.1] [5.0] [5.2] [5.7] [5.4]  [-1.6] 
               
 All  0.75% 0.64% 0.65% 0.63% 0.63% 0.61% 0.77% 0.62% 0.67% 0.80%  -0.04% 
   [3.7] [3.7] [4.0] [4.2] [4.3] [4.1] [5.6] [4.6] [5.0] [5.6]  [-0.3] 
Years 6-10 Quarterend  0.93% 0.92% 0.80% 0.66% 0.79% 0.73% 0.57% 0.63% 0.38% 0.27%  0.66% 
   [4.9] [5.6] [5.2] [4.4] [5.5] [5.1] [4.0] [4.5] [2.6] [1.8]  [5.3] 
 Non-quarterend  0.60% 0.48% 0.45% 0.48% 0.61% 0.66% 0.81% 0.83% 0.75% 1.04%  -0.43% 
   [3.1] [2.9] [2.9] [3.2] [4.2] [4.7] [5.6] [6.0] [5.4] [7.1]  [-3.2] 
               
 All  0.77% 0.68% 0.70% 0.66% 0.64% 0.61% 0.63% 0.66% 0.64% 0.65%  0.12% 
   [4.4] [4.4] [4.7] [4.5] [4.3] [4.2] [4.3] [4.5] [4.5] [4.2]  [1.0] 
Years 11-15 Quarterend  0.87% 0.79% 0.78% 0.80% 0.60% 0.56% 0.66% 0.59% 0.47% 0.34%  0.53% 
   [5.3] [5.3] [5.3] [5.4] [4.2] [3.9] [4.6] [4.0] [3.2] [2.2]  [5.1] 
 Non-quarterend  0.55% 0.60% 0.67% 0.58% 0.66% 0.71% 0.65% 0.68% 0.71% 0.83%  -0.27% 
   [3.2] [3.9] [4.5] [3.9] [4.5] [4.9] [4.5] [4.7] [4.8] [5.3]  [-2.5] 
               
 All  0.70% 0.58% 0.73% 0.65% 0.59% 0.65% 0.66% 0.62% 0.56% 0.67%  0.03% 
   [4.1] [3.7] [4.8] [4.4] [4.0] [4.6] [4.7] [4.4] [4.0] [4.4]  [0.3] 
Years 16-20 Quarterend  0.76% 0.74% 0.73% 0.73% 0.70% 0.69% 0.63% 0.53% 0.37% 0.47%  0.29% 
   [4.6] [4.9] [5.0] [5.0] [4.9] [4.9] [4.3] [3.8] [2.5] [2.9]  [2.6] 
 Non-quarterend  0.60% 0.66% 0.54% 0.61% 0.54% 0.66% 0.59% 0.68% 0.72% 0.82%  -0.22% 
   [3.5] [4.2] [3.7] [4.2] [3.5] [4.6] [4.2] [4.8] [5.1] [5.4]  [-2.0] 
 
